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
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The States-System of Europe.

THE
STATES-SYSTEM OF EUROPE;

BEING

A COURSE OF LECTURES

EXPOSING

Modern Functionary-ism and Diplomacy.

BY DR. REINHOLD SOLGER.

EDITED BY REV. P. R. WILLANS.



"O rois soyez grands, car le peuple grandit."—VICTOR HUGO.

London:

ROBERT THEOBALD, 26, PATERNOSTER ROW;
HALIFAX: T. & W. BIRTWHISTLE, NORTHGATE.

MDCCCLIV.

223. g. 27.

T. AND W. BIRTWHISTLE, PRINTERS, NORTHGATE, HALIFAX.

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
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
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ERRATA.

- Page 1. Line 8 from the top. *For* "From this general rule," &c., *read*
"To this general rule," &c.
- „ 8. Line 9 from the bottom. *For* "1300—1500," *read* A.D. 1300—
A.D. 1500." Ditto in the heading of the page.
- „ 18. Line 7 from the bottom. *For* "Hohenzollen," *read* "Hohen-
zollern."
- „ 19. The same in line 6 from the top.
- „ 20. Line 6 from the top. *For* "vicê," *read* "vice."
- „ 21. Line 5 from the top. *For* "1648," *read* "1848."
- „ 115. Line 9 from the top. *After* "admiration," *insert* "than myself."



INTRODUCTION.

THE little Work, thus presented to the English public, is the production of DR. REINHOLD SOLGER, a native of Prussia, not very long since connected with a Chair of political economy on the Continent, and a member of the "Convention of Frankfort." An avowal of liberal opinions during the events of 1848, led to his abandonment of a moderate competency, and to his becoming a refugee in this country. During the years 1852 and 1853, he delivered the substance of the following pages in Lectures on "England and the Continent," in London, Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds, Bradford and Halifax. At the last-mentioned place, public interest was so much aroused, as to induce a resident publisher to effect arrangements with Dr. Solger, which issued in his MSS. being confided to my care during last Spring, with a view to bringing the Lectures before the public. Considerable difficulties presented themselves in the disposal and preparation of papers composed by a foreigner, in

a language not his own ; but I may, perhaps, be permitted to say that I did not suffer this difficulty to deter me from attempting to accomplish an object in which I was interested by higher considerations than those of profit and loss.

It is my belief that the following pages will be found to represent Dr. Solger's sentiments *faithfully*, and that in his own words, excepting where singularity of idiom or construction rendered alteration necessary. Such alteration, however, has been most sparingly made, for I preferred retaining some peculiarities incident to a foreigner's composition in English, as giving raciness and point to the Author's observations, and as likely, moreover, to recal the Author to the memories of those who *heard* the Lectures delivered. It has been my desire to verify from all available sources the Author's statements. I have also laboured to assist the mind of the reader by the eye through "headings" at the top of the different pages, and a table of contents.

A lengthened interval has elapsed since the proposal to print these Lectures was entertained, and I, therefore, feel it only just to myself and the publishers to state, that this delay has occurred, simply from the illness of the Author in America—illness that has ultimately prevented the realization of a prospect once held out of additional matter from him. Under these circumstances, I may, perhaps, be allowed to trespass

a little further on the attention of the readers of this Work, by endeavouring to point out what I conceive to be the peculiar merit of the author at a time like the present, and the claims which this book has upon public attention owing to recent events.

As the production of a native of Prussia, this exposition of the States-system of Europe* appears to me to possess peculiar advantages in being the work of a man brought up in the midst of the functionary-ism and diplomacy of the Continent—of a man, therefore, likely to *realize* the results, national and international, of such a system far better than we Englishmen can possibly do in our isolated position. It is my conviction that we do not prize as we ought that inestimable sheet of water which rolls between us and the Continent, and but for which, we believe, things would have been with us far otherwise than they are. At the same time, we must not forget that there is a law of compensation, even in such things as local advantages, and that what may conduce under divine Providence to our safety as a country, may not equally conduce to our knowledge. We are too apt to judge of European affairs from an English standpoint. We do not see and feel things there, as a native sees and feels them. It seems to me well, on

* The title of this Book has been suggested by the German word "*Staats-system*," which includes *national* and *international* policy.

this ground, for Englishmen to listen to a story of the Continent, as told by one who has been an eye-witness of what is the every-day working of those paternal governments so much praised in certain quarters. They may then feel the force of Macaulay's words in his critique on the Colloquies of that Anglo-Prussian—Robert Southey.

“ It is not by the intermeddling of Mr. Southey's idol, the omniscient and omnipotent State, but by the prudence and energy of the people, that England has hitherto been carried forward in civilization ; and it is to the same prudence, and the same energy that we now look with comfort and good hope. Our rulers will best promote the improvement of the nation, by strictly confining themselves to their own legitimate duties, by leaving capital to find its most lucrative course, commodities their fair price, industry and intelligence their natural reward, idleness and folly their natural punishment, by maintaining peace, by defending property, by diminishing the price of land, and by observing strict economy in every department of the State. Let the Government do this : the people will assuredly do the rest.” *

But besides the value of this Work, as causing us to feel in this country how these things are estimated abroad by those who ought best to know their merits, it possesses still further claims upon our regard, from

* *Edinburgh Review*, 1830.

the corroboration furnished by recent events of many of the views and predictions of our Author. Readers must remember, that these Lectures were first delivered eighteen months before the occupation of the Danubian principalities by Russia, and if any one may have thought when these Lectures were heard, that the danger of Russian progress and ascendancy was over-estimated, his opinion now surely must be changed.

“ This country which, within a century and a half, has pushed its frontier 700 miles towards Berlin, 650 miles towards Stockholm, 500 miles towards Constantinople, and 1000 miles towards Teheran and Calcutta, is not likely to stop at Constantinople, if it even got there.” *

Much, too, has come to the ear of the public respecting the evils of that *secret diplomacy* to which our Author refers, since these pages were penned. We have had a little daylight thrown upon the management of our Foreign Office in relation to the affairs of Poland, Hungary, and Sleswig Holstein; and while some statements of the author of “ The Progress of Russia ” are to be received with caution; yet, we cannot but rise from the perusal of a volume that records *on authority* Brunnow’s cajolery of Palmerston, and Palmerston’s deafness to the warning cry of Kossuth,† without feeling the sooner we are

* *British Quarterly Review*, xxxvi., p. 560.

† *Urquhart’s “ Progress of Russia,”* p. 94—113.

secured against having our affairs transacted so much in the dark, the better for Englishmen and for mankind. I need hardly say, that late events have more than confirmed the Author's statements respecting the intrigues of the Russian government at Herat and Teheran. We must now feel that Persia may be regarded as a very doubtful sort of friend at the best, when Russian roubles are at work. That treaties are no guarantee of peace, according to the present state of things, has been shown by the history of the "Vienna note," and here again, many of the positions of our Author are verified.

I do not account myself responsible in any degree for Dr. Solger's sentiments, and I am far from agreeing with him in his theory of the remedy for Europe, but I am of opinion, that this Work may be studied with advantage by many of those well-meaning, but mistaken men, who call for "peace, peace," when no basis for a true and lasting peace is to be obtained under the present system of European affairs. I yield to no man in my love of peace,—but my peace must be a righteous one, or I cannot love it! I trust not to be deemed unmindful of the evils of war, when saying that I conscientiously believe that greater evils may connect themselves with a state of *hollow peace* than with a state of war. The threefold argument of non-interventionists seems to me *not* to be a threefold cord that cannot be broken, for if we, Eng-

lishmen, look at peace from the selfish point of view and say,—“this aggression is not our business,” care must be taken lest we fail to see the mutual dependance of men in society *at all*! There was once an old-world wearer of motley, who said something of this kind :

“ A woodman came into a forest to ask the trees to give him a handle for his axe. It seemed so modest a request, that the principal trees at once agreed to it, and it was settled among them that the plain homely ash should furnish what was wanted. No sooner had the woodman fitted the staff to his purpose, than he began laying about on all sides, felling the noblest trees in the wood. The oak now seeing the whole matter too late, whispered to the cedar, ‘The first concession has lost all; if we had not sacrificed our humble neighbour, we might have yet stood for ages ourselves.’ Let our peace friends see to the moral of this fable, in relation to the argument for peace from self-interest.

The argument from commerce is one I would not despise as simply utilitarian, did it not happen, unfortunately for the advocates of non-intervention, that commercial interests can be shown to be anything but on the side of false peace in the long run. Under cover of the peace that has been, Russia has possessed herself of the Danube, and over-run Wallachia and Moldavia, sources of wealth far greater than any to be found in the alliance with Russia herself.* The argument

* *Urquhart's "Progress of Russia,"* p. 292—324.

which I may call the moral and religious one in favour of non-intervention, is one to which I shall, perhaps, be expected to pay more attention. A great outcry is raised respecting the slaughters of Olteneitz and Sinope, and there, it is said, are the horrors incarnated into which some professing Christianity desire to plunge us! Has it escaped the recollection of those who thus reason, that while war is slaying its thousands, a state of things has existed on the Continent, which has been slaughtering its millions annually, and that under the colour of a false peace! The sterile tracts of Siberia, and the depths of Austrian dungeons witness to the destruction of Poles, Hungarians, and Italians, not by war, but by despotism. Is not a war that shall bring an end to such evils preferable to a peace that shall continue them? Again, if war be opposed to the interests of religion and morality, is not despotism? I hesitate not to say, infinitely more so. Under a rule that crushes body and mind in a man, there may be regard to priestcraft as an instrument of despotism, but little, depend upon it, very little real deference to the claims of mere morality, let alone religion. Neither religion nor morality can be made to advocate the continuance of a non-intervention which goes to perpetuate systematized oppression. The words of a Christian poetess, an eye-witness of the doings of despotic power in Italy, deserve the attention of the thoughtful on this point.

“ I love no peace which is not fellowship,
And which includes not mercy. I would have
Rather, the raking of the guns across
The world, and shrieks against Heaven’s architrave ;
Rather the struggle in the slippery fosse,
Of dying men and horses, and the wave
Blood-bubbling Enough said !—By Christ’s own
cross,

And by the faint heart of my womanhood,
Such things are better than a peace which sits
Beside the hearth in self-commended mood,
And takes no thought, how wind and rain by fits
Are howling out of doors against the good
Of the poor wanderer. What ! your peace admits
Of outside anguish while it sits at home ?
I loathe to take its name upon my tongue.—
It is no peace. ’Tis treason, stiff with doom,
’Tis gagged despair, and inarticulate wrong,
Annihilated Poland, stifled Rome,
Dazed Naples, Hungary fainting ’neath the thong,
And Austria wearing a smooth olive-leaf
On her brute forehead, while her hoofs outpress
The life from these Italian souls,—in brief,
O Lord of peace, who art Lord of righteousness,
Constrain the anguished worlds from sin and grief,
Pierce them with conscience, purge them with redress,
And give us *peace which is no counterfeit !*” *

* “ Casa Guidi Windows.” By Mrs. BROWNING, p. 111, 112.

Far be it from me, I repeat, to think or speak lightly of the terrible evils of war. Satanic must be the nature that can do that, but I verily believe that, in the present crisis, war is the lesser of two evils. Be it chosen then only as a *necessary evil* and an *ultimate resource*. I look to a struggle of the nations, if struggle there must be, with most painful feelings, but I believe that doing our duty, and discharging our obligations, we need not, as Englishmen, fear the result. The day of calamity will be shortened, in my opinion, by *decisive* measures, for "if there be any truth established by the universal experience of nations, it is this, that to carry the spirit of peace into war is a weak and cruel policy. The time of negotiation is the time for deliberation and delay. But when an extreme case calls for that remedy, which is in its own nature most violent, and which in such cases, is a remedy only because it is violent, it is idle to think of mitigating and diluting. Languid war can do nothing which negotiation or submission will not do better: and to act on any other principle is not to save blood and money, but to squander them."†

May all these apparent evils be made to subserve the purpose of Him whose throne is founded in righteousness and judgment; and aid in the spread of those principles of divine truth, which can secure


† T. B. Macaulay, *Edin. Review*, 1828.

the only basis for a true peace in Europe and the world.

These Lectures may suffice to show what our human nature is without the ameliorating influences of true religion. If they so do, and tend to inform the English public more thoroughly, about what is passing in Europe at the present time, my wish will be fully realized.

P. R. WILLANS.

HALIFAX, 1854.



LECTURE I.

THE TREATIES.

Origin and Character of the "Balance of Power."—The Treaties of 1648
and of 1815.

As a rule, the state of public feeling in this country, with regard to foreign politics, is divided between long periods of apathy and short passages of excitement. During times of tranquillity on the Continent, most people are glad not to be annoyed with revolutionary recollections, and when the days of disturbance break upon them, they rush into parties, as their feelings, passions, and prejudices, prompt them. From this general rule, however, I have observed that the people of the manufacturing districts form a favourable exception.

It stands to reason that times of tranquillity are just those in which the seeds of whatever is in the future are sown and matured, and that times of general convulsion are least favourable to the formation of opinion. It is, therefore, most gratifying, not only on personal but also on public grounds, to be in the midst of a meeting assembled not for the purpose of expressing passionate feeling on a subject imperfectly understood, but for the purpose of obtaining by earnest inquiry a satisfactory solution of the riddles of European politics. Let us, then, at once attack the radical error which leads most people, in the very outset, into incurable mistakes. I mean the error of ascribing

2 *Popular Mistakes about Continental Politics.*

undue importance to the will of individuals, and to abrupt resolutions. Most persons have a notion, that if the Kings would only allow greater scope to popular liberty, or if the people were not given to extravagant schemes and demands, there would at once be an end of all these mutual difficulties. Nothing, at first sight, is more just than this view of Continental affairs, yet nobody would ever suppose that the Queen of England could, if she were determined to do so, abolish the liberties of this country, and establish the rule of absolutism over her people. In supposing such a project, it is immediately felt that the liberty of England is based upon ancient traditions, deeply rooted habits, and energetic interests, far too powerful to yield to the will and efforts of any single individual or party, however strong and determined. Now the mistake which I complain of as being most in the way of a true appreciation of European politics, is this, that it is overlooked that such traditions, habits, and interests, do not only exist in England, but in all other countries. They are traditions, habits, and interests, often of a different kind, but such as they are, they are as strong in most despotically governed states as they are in this realm ; and it is no more impossible for the Constitutional Queen of England to change, if she desired, the free Constitution of this country into an absolute government, than it is for the absolute despot of Austria to make of the Austrian Monarchy a Constitutional Kingdom. Another example, perhaps, will make my meaning still clearer. Suppose the *Times*, which was wont to come out so profoundly on the follies of the Continental Rulers and people, were to thunder and sneer at the insane radicalism of certain people attempting to overthrow the order of the Jesuits ; and yet, whilst thus venting its indignation against what in this

case would be the extreme and democratic party, imagine the *Times*, true to its common-place wisdom, were to advise the order of Jesus, by timely concessions in the sense of Protestantism, to avoid the dangers of a violent dissolution of the society!! You see at once the absurdity of the supposed admonition. If the Jesuit General be inclined to Protestantism, he is at liberty to resign his office; it may even be imagined that, under certain circumstances, he might succeed in breaking up the whole order; but it is utterly beyond either his own power or the range of probability, to reform the Society of Jesus in a Protestant sense. Their *system* does not admit of such a reform. The *principles* of Jesuitism and of Protestantism are absolutely incompatible with each other. Now this is the question which the sages of the press regularly omit to ask before giving advice to their neighbours. They are very inquisitive about the character of the King of Prussia, and very anxious respecting the projects of the Emperor of France; but they never think it worth their while for a moment to contemplate the principles upon which the states of those monarchs are established or the political system upon which the international relations between the European powers rest. That, however, is just the thing most important to contemplate. For, if the system of Europe should be found to be as incompatible with liberty and peace as Jesuitism is with Protestantism, it is at once evident that the utmost efforts of rulers or peoples must remain delusive; and all essential evils of despotism and war must remain at work, either secretly or openly, as long as the system remains unbroken. Now this is what we are going to investigate here. I must, therefore, first lead you back to the very beginning of modern history.

The question is—to know what are the principles

upon which the present European states and their mutual relationships are based. Are they the creations of justice, freedom, and love? or is the spirit which has presided over their creation the mere offspring of selfishness—bare selfishness?

After the period of general confusion which followed upon the overthrow of the Roman empire, our modern era emerges first into shape with Charlemagne. That great man gave a constitution, not only to one particular country, but to all Austrian Europe. Now what were the principles, both of himself and of his age, upon which that constitution was framed?

They were rough men, that old Emperor and his people; they had many of the vices and passions of barbarians, but they came fresh from the hands of Christianity; and although they took Christianity in its very crudest outline, they reasoned in this way:—"If all men are children of one father, and members of one family, this ought not to be merely a fine subject to preach about in the pulpit, but a reality throughout;" and so Charlemagne and the Roman bishop set to work to *make* all men really members of the same family; and those children who refused to obey had to kiss the rod. Such was the sublime plan of Charlemagne.

He caused himself to be anointed by the Pope as the head of the universal community of mankind; and he and his followers in the imperial dignity were understood to be under obligation to extend the limits of their Christian empire over all the peoples of the earth. And so, whenever a people either forcibly or freely adopted the Christian faith, that people were by that very act considered to acknowledge the dominion of the Pope and of the Emperor. It is true that countries like Spain and England, which by their situation were out of the way of the Emperor's material power,

remained independent in fact; yet, as a matter of principle, it was throughout the middle ages considered beyond dispute, that all the nations were members of one religious and political brotherhood, of which the Roman bishop was the spiritual head, and of which the German Emperor was the secular chief.

Even at a time when the Emperor's power was miserably weak, the Kings of England and of France submitted their quarrels to his decision, and received territories disputed by them as fiefs from his hand; and as late as the last century, the Elector of Brandenburg did not dare to assume the title of King of Prussia without having procured the Emperor's sanction, which was bought by means of much money and important political concessions.

It is important to bear this in mind, because it shows what were the principles presiding originally over the public law of Europe. They were, indeed, not principles of mere brute force. It was not the so-called *right* of conquest which plays such a prominent part in the modern hand-books on international law from which Kings and States derived the title-deeds of their sovereignty. No! the public law was in harmony with the religious and moral law, as the latter were understood in those times. They were very imperfectly understood, no doubt; but that does not in any way detract from the principle, that during the middle ages there were no such two different standards, the one of public life and the other of private life, as there are now. What was right in religion in those days was not considered to be absurd in politics; and what was defended by the moral law was considered to be sanctioned by the law of nations. The mistake of Charlemagne's Empire, and of the Church was not to have introduced human brotherhood into politics, but

to have believed that human brotherhood could be realized by a decree, by force, and by authority. They only saw one side of the question, viz., the unity of the human race. They did not consider that, in spite of this general unity, men are individually and materially different. The feeling of that difference is even originally stronger than the promptings of their brotherly feelings. It is only in consequence of a long intercourse that by learning from each other men begin to understand each other, and find in the end that the moral and intellectual cultivation of every human being is essentially the same; and then the result is Love.

You see, then, where the mistake of the Church of the Empire and of all Radicalism lies. It is *beginning at the wrong end*. It is commanding unity before an understanding has been effected; and it is overlooking that an understanding can only be effected by perfect freedom—even the freedom of dealing blows against each other. Blows are the indispensable preliminary to a good understanding between men of marked peculiarities of character. Your soft idealist when he sees people knock each other down cries immediately for enlightened despotism. He does not see that men of strong natural antipathies will never be friendly till they have fought out their quarrel fairly.

Thus it is with individuals: thus it is with nations. The Peace Society, in my opinion, does not sufficiently consider this point. Neither did Charlemagne, nor the Pope. Their empire was composed of two principal races—the Germanic and the Romanic races, which were far from being reconciled either in spirit, habit, or interest, by their forcible combination into one spiritual and political empire. The more civilized race despised and hated their conquerors for their barbarous

Differences between Pope & Emperor—their Tendency. 7

manners, and in the consciousness of their mental superiority, aimed, under the leadership of the Roman Bishop, at spiritual dominion over their political conquerors.

The vigorous and sturdy race of the latter despised and hated the southern people for their effeminacy and corruption. Thus a struggle began in the heart of the Christian Empire, a struggle between the spiritual and political power, which was at the same time a struggle between the Romanic and Germanic races.

Whilst the successors of Charlemagne sent their armies over the Alps to keep the revolting Italians in subjection, the Pope attacked the authority of the Emperor with spiritual weapons in the very heart of Germany, hurling the ban of excommunication against him, and freeing his vassals from their oaths of allegiance. The governors and vassals who had been instituted by the Emperor, over the different parts of Germany and Italy, very naturally took the advantage of the quarrels between their two chiefs. They sided with the Pope or with the Emperor, just as either held out to them greater privilege and independence; and in proportion as their individual power increased by those means, they made war upon their neighbours to extend their territories still farther.

The general tendency of such a state of things was to develop a spirit of selfish ambition, diplomatic plotting, military venality, and unscrupulous treachery. In the end, there was not one of the more powerful Italian or German Barons who had not wrested an almost independent principality by diplomatic intrigues, poisonings, armed surprises, and other means of an equally ruthless character, either from the Emperor, the Pope, or from some neighbour. It was thus that the foundation of the present independent sovereign

states of Germany and Italy was laid. The great ideas of Charlemagne, and the great purposes of the empire, were swamped in baronial anarchy ; and when, in the year 1273, Count Rudolph, of Hapsburgh, was elected to the imperial throne, it was a mere matter of form, and the powerful Lords who appointed him did so because he was poor and powerless, and because therefore there seemed to be no danger of his interfering with their lawless practices. The new Emperor himself had spent his previous life in hiring himself out as the leader of a small mercenary band with the help of which he fought the quarrels of the Swiss towns, and abbots against each other. It was not to be expected that such a man, in such an age, would have been capable of as much as comprehending the sublime character of his imperial office ; but what he comprehended very well, was, that its possession might furnish him with a pretext to increase his military power, and to conquer a good piece of ground for his private property. Accordingly, on some specious pretext, he declared the King of Bohemia, one of the vassals of the Empire, guilty of high treason, and seized upon the Grand Duchy of Austria, which then formed a part of that King's territory. Thus the foundation of the Austrian monarchy, and of the power of the House of Hapsburgh was laid. It took the Hapsburghers about 200 years (in round numbers, from 1300 to 1500), to unite by the same sort of policy half the countries of Europe under their dominion. But whilst they were thus engaged, the Kings of France had pursued the same policy with nearly the same success ; and about the year 1500, we, accordingly, find in Europe—

1. Italy and Germany divided into a countless number of smaller or larger baronetcies, independent in all but in name of the Empire.

2. We find two powerful Dynasties,—viz. the House of Hapsburgh and of Valois,—arrayed against each other for the struggle of dominion over the German and Italian principalities lying between them.

Now, what is the reason that the dynasties of France and Austria had become so powerful, whilst Italy and Germany became dismembered into such numberless principalities lying between them? It was because France and Austria, like England, Sweden and Russia, were out of the way of the central struggle. You perceive the difference. In the centre there was an Empire consisting of two nations, the Italian and the German, with two Chiefs, neither of whom ever died, because their dignity was not a personal one. There was ever to be a spiritual head, and there was ever to be a secular head of the Empire, and consequently, there was always a party of the Pope in the centre of Germany, and a party of the Emperor in the heart of Italy. Thus it became impossible that one great and compact body of Germans should ever be formed against one great and compact Italian nation. This was altogether different in the border countries of Europe. France, Spain, England, the Netherlands, in the West; Sweden, Brandenburg, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Turkey, in the North and East, took no direct part in the great struggle. If in these latter countries a King had once conquered, there was an end of the struggle. Two small principalities had been united into one of double the size; and so on again, and again, till all the petty districts of Spain, France, England, &c., had coalesced into one Kingdom of Spain, one Kingdom of England, one Kingdom of France. This is the reason, as you observe, that in the East, West, and North of Europe, great powers gradually arose, whilst the centre crumbled into pieces.

10 *Change of the Theory of Continental Government.*

And now, when the general result came to make itself felt, European history took another turn. Before France and Austria had become two great compact bodies, the direction of all general affairs and of the civilization of Europe had emanated from one political and one religious centre: and moreover the leading political ideas *had, until then, been in accordance with the religious and the moral notions of men.* As religion taught them that all men were brothers, so the public law taught them that there was only one Empire of Christendom of which the Pope as well as the Emperor were the elected administrators; and that in such capacity these two were entitled to command the allegiance and obedience of all the different members of the universal community. And again, those Ecclesiastical and Secular princes, whom the Pope and the Emperor appointed in the different parts of the universal Empire to govern and administer justice in their stead, were of course entitled to obedience in their capacity of *administrators*, not as proprietors of the lands and men therein.

The idea that any *personal property or right* could constitute for princes a claim to the possession and government of countries and men—an idea as incompatible with human reason as with the fundamental principles of the Christian religion—was altogether foreign to the public law of the Middle ages, which, as I said was, as it ought to be, in accordance with the moral notions of the age. But now, when the princes of France and Austria, after having grown under the shelter of their outward situations, stood face to face, each as the master of a great and concentrated power, the dismembered and distracted Romanic German Empire vanished into insignificance before the personal ambition of two great families. And now

the public law of Europe became based upon the notion that certain *families* had the right of disposing of men and countries amongst themselves, and that as it best suited their own private purposes. And thus the principles of the public law of Europe became directly opposed to all other principles whether of reason, religion, or morality. This then is the great turning point of our history. The question which, since the ascendancy of the Houses of Hapsburgh and Valois, agitated the people of Europe, was no longer, how to reconcile the minds and interests of the two leading races, the Romanic and the Teutonic, and to establish a lasting harmony between all men and all nations; but the question was now, whether the dynasty of France, or the dynasty of Austria, should appropriate all the countries and all the people of the European Continent.

In course of time, other dynasties took part in this struggle for ascendancy; and thus the present political system of Europe originated and developed itself on the basis of private rapacity, being devoid of any other principle than that of success.

In its first stage, and in its most simple form, about 350 to 400 years ago, the contest for ascendancy was carried on by only two great dynasties, between whom the rest played the part of equalizing weights. Charles V. of Austria, first conquered from his antagonist, Francis I. of France, Italy; and established an almost absolute power over all the princes of Germany. But now the Pope and most of the Italian Lords, in conjunction with Henry VIII. of England, began to grow alarmed at the fearful increase of the power of the Hapsburgh family; and they, who had first sided with Charles against Francis, now joined Francis to put a check upon Charles. By this policy it became, on the whole, very difficult for either the Austrian or the French

dynasty to unite all the rest of Europe to its dominions, and thus originated the so-called system of the balance of power, to be maintained between the greater dynasties, by all kinds of sly combinations with a number of smaller ones or amongst themselves.

After having explained to you how the present system of the balance of power arose out of the general disposition of the European body politic, I may be allowed to ask, what you think of that balance? Is it not a glorious thing, that—thanks to this system, this admirable equilibrium of power—no one of the reigning families of Europe has a reasonable chance of subjecting the territories of all the other reigning families to its own dominion?

In reply I may well ask, What interest could any man, or village, or town, throughout Europe, possibly have in belonging to Charles V. rather than to Francis I.; or to Francis I. rather than to Charles V.? If Europe had been politically divided into different nations, such as the German, the French, the Italian, the Hungarian, the Polish, and so on; in that case, of course, it would have been just and wise if all the nations had united against the ambition of one amongst them, to prevent her from conquering all the rest: but since the nations were dismembered and parcelled out, or unnaturally chained together, by means of crimes and violence to so many families, it was, I should think, much rather for their interest to belong all to one family, than to be driven year after year into the field to shoot each other for no other reason than to keep up an equality of power between the House of Hapsburgh and the House of Valois. You remember from Shakspeare that in the town of Verona there were also two Houses—the House of Capulet and the House of Montague—the balance between

whom was kept up by daily sanguinary affrays between their retainers. Now when, in one of these affrays, Mercutio, a fiery partizan of the house of Montague, received a mortal blow, it occurred to him, unfortunately too late, that he had been a great fool to throw away his life in such a manner for the glory and greatness of other people; and Shakspeare makes the dying man say—

—————"a plague o' both your houses,
They have made worm's meat of me."

This is exactly the present feeling of the people of the Continent with regard to the forty or fifty families for whom they have been killing, wronging, and injuring each other for these last four centuries. From its very origin the system of the balance of power involved the whole of Europe in a sanguinary contest for and against Hapsburgh and Valois.

About one hundred years later, a third great dynasty arose to dispute with the two former ones the partition of Central Europe. This third one was the House of Vasa, of Sweden, which had risen into significance for the same reason which had favoured the elevation of France and Austria, viz., on account of its lying out of the way of the struggle between Germanism and Romanism. The great war in which the Houses of Hapsburgh, of Bourbon, and of Vasa disputed with one another the supremacy of the Continent, lasted thirty years without interruption. For the people, the thirty years' war was a war of Religion; for the Dynasties, Religion was merely a pretext of aggrandisement and of breaking loose from the last moral and legal obligations towards the common Empire.

Individual success was thenceforth proclaimed as the sole principle of political morals. All the adventurers

and desperate men of Europe—Germans, Italians, Frenchmen, Spaniards, Englishmen, Scotchmen, Hungarians, Croats, Wallachs, and Wallons, hastened to swell the armies of Hapsburgh or those of Brunswick and Mansfeldt. When Austria was on the eve of pocketing the whole of Germany, France and Sweden stepped in, and in accordance with the balancing principle tried to pocket it for themselves. After having thus been balancing their armies and their treasures against each other for many years, and each power having found it impossible to appropriate the whole, an understanding was at length effected that the three powers should go shares. Thus, the House of Bourbon obtained the German province of Alsace, the House of Hapsburgh, the province of Bohemia, and the House of Vasa the greater part of Pomerania, whilst their respective allies amongst the German Princes obtained by stipulation a proportionate increase of territory.

On the whole, 140 pieces of land were in this manner parcelled out amongst the contracting parties at the peace of Westphalia, i. e., other parties were despoiled of 140 pieces of land to satisfy the greediness of those who had the greatest number of troops in the field or employed the greatest skill in outwitting their colleagues at the diplomatic conferences; and these allotments having been assigned to the three great powers, and to the Lords of Bavaria, Brandenburg, Saxony, and several others besides—by their agreement the peace was finally concluded, at Osnabruck, all the parties solemnly agreeing to guarantee to one another the respective portions of property thus acquired. This was the first General Congress of all the European Princes, about 200 years ago, in 1648, by which it was established as a principle that the greater dynasties might, by common agreement, enlarge, or curtail, or entirely

abolish the small ones, and might dispose of the countries and peoples of Europe amongst themselves as so much property. These principles are still in force; they still form the basis of what is called the public law of Europe; and only the other day the great powers—i. e., the great sovereigns of Europe—made an agreement among themselves as to which of them should possess the people of Sleswig and Holstein after the decease of the present proprietor; and the Foreign Office of England took a part in that transaction. Thus we see that what is called the Public Law of Europe is based upon principles which, if put into practice by any private individual, are punishable with transportation, imprisonment, or capital punishment. Lords in possession of one castle, or officers of the Empire who had broken their allegiance, or reckless adventurers and prize-fighters who gathered around them a band of lawless and desperate men, or shrewd cheats who got the better of other people's simplicity, or assassins who had stabbed and poisoned those who had prior possession, such in the majority of instances were the men who having, in the course of centuries, annexed one castle after another, one town after another, one piece of ground after another to their spoil, finally, by the peace of Westphalia, had the impudence to guarantee to one another the possession of their plunder! Now, not only by the law of reason, but by the positive law of the Empire, the lands and people thus divided amongst them could never be the personal or family property of any of them. They therefore guaranteed to one another what they had no right to dispose of. They assumed at the congress of Westphalia the right of contracting and treating about the people, who thenceforth were divided, transferred, inherited, entailed, given away, sold, bought, and exchanged, like ordinary

goods and chattels; and the descendants of the people thus disposed of are now told that these contracts are binding upon them, and that the order established by those treaties is a sacred order, although it is difficult to see why a contract between his majesty the King of Prussia, and his majesty the Emperor of Austria, and his imperial absurdity the Dictator of France, by which, for instance, Belgium was guaranteed to France, should be any more binding upon the people of that country than a contract concluded between three thieves respecting the contents of my strong box should be binding upon myself.

Imagine only your sovereign making a contract with the Emperor of Austria, promising him this county of York in exchange for Croatia! What would the people of England say to such a treaty? I take refuge in impossible suppositions, you think. It certainly is an impossible and absurd supposition as far as England is concerned; but it is upon transactions of exactly the same character that the present divisions of the Continental States, the title-deeds of the Continental sovereigns, the international system of Europe, and the present European order rest.

And if the moral sense of every Englishman revolts at the idea of such an indignity being offered to himself, he ought to blush at the idea of such an order of things being defended by some of the most influential organs of the press of his country. Only nations entirely broken down by their sufferings, and by a series of unfortunate circumstances deprived of all possibility of united action; in short, only nations who have virtually ceased to be nations could suffer themselves to be imposed upon by such mockery, and it is certain that the people of Germany and Italy, on the re-awakening of their national conscience, must deeply resent the

moral disgrace of their condition—certain as that all Englishmen must resent the mere idea of being disposed of by contract between any two or three families whatever.

From the causes thus explained Germany and Italy had been dismembered for centuries, and the thirty years' war finally reduced them to atoms.

Their powerful and flourishing towns and the castles of their nobles were, during that long war, ransacked, pillaged, burnt down, and made nothing more or less than prizes for the armies which fought for them. Each town and each noble had to pass separately from hand to hand, and from hand to hand again. There was no longer any stable community amongst them; there were no longer any common assemblies of nobles or any common representatives of Counties and Towns for the defence of common rights, but each County or Town was separately taken and re-taken by an overpowering force; each of them had separately to swear fidelity to the generals who, in turn, disposed of its existence, and each of them had to pay separately the heavy contribution which none of their conquerors failed to impose upon them: having therefore become quite incapable of doing anything for themselves, they considered themselves very fortunate when at last peace was declared and they were informed to what Master in future they should belong. Pay and obey: such was the condition of the people who, at the peace of Westphalia, were divided amongst some hundreds of prize-fighters to form what was now called the states of these Masters. The diplomatists, who at the Conferences of 1648 believed that they had settled the affairs of the world amongst them, considered it superfluous, as diplomatists always consider it, to look beyond the possible junctures of the moment or to reflect that in

history other powers are at work than diplomatic shrewdness. In like manner the diplomatists of Vienna are still unconscious to this very day that the progress of the United States of America—the opening of the Chinese Empire—the rapid rise of California and Australia—the incredible facility of communication—the inventions and discoveries of every kind, and the progress of science and enlightenment—must sooner or later break through their treaties, and make their efforts to balance the world upon their basis simply ridiculous.

Thus the diplomatists of Westphalia entirely forgot the immense tracts of land which extended in the East, at the back of Austria and Sweden, over the half of Europe and Asia; nor did the immense expanse of water in the West, which was already crossed and recrossed by the vessels of Spain, the Netherlands, and England, ever enter into their calculation. At the very moment when they imagined they had established the order of the world for ever in accordance with their own selfish purposes, two new powers started into life without asking their permission, and soon grew so strong as to reduce Sweden, which for a moment had played the part of supreme arbiter of the European Dynasties, to the position of a second-rate power. These two new powers were Brandenburg and Russia. The Electorate of Brandenburg had been given in pawn by one of the German Emperors to one Hohenzollen; and as the pledge was never redeemed, the Hohenzollen family remain in possession of it to this very day, no doubt with very good reason.

Now, being enclosed between the then powerful Empires of Sweden and Poland, Frederick William of Brandenburg, called the Great Elector, adopted the very simple policy of alternately leaguings with Sweden

against the Poles, and with the Poles against Sweden, by which means he laid the foundation of the greatness of Prussia, such as it is. About one hundred years later, i. e., about one hundred years ago, Frederick the Great, having enriched himself with the spoil of all the neighbouring princes, doubled the Hohenzollen possessions, and thus threw a new weight into the scale of the European balance. It was Frederick the Great who proposed to Austria and Russia the partition of Poland, and prevailed upon those two powers by means of persuasion and threats to accede to his proposal. The partition of Poland raised the virtuous indignation of all the European Governments and people. The Governments cried out that the principles of the European equilibrium had been violated, which in reality meant that they had not been allowed to have their share in the profits of the transaction.

The second power which had taken the liberty of starting into life without the permission of the Congress of Westphalia was Russia. The cradle of that now immense empire was that small tract of land originally bearing the name of Kiev. This Duchy had been tributary for centuries to the Mongols and Tartars; when a little before the time of Luther and Henry VIII. the Grand Duke, John Basilowitz, managed to set his masters, the Mongols and Tartars, against each other, and thus to make himself independent of them. This being done, succeeding Czars found all the immense tracts of land in the North and East of their Principality inhabited by feeble and thinly spread races, and rapidly extended their dominion over Moscow, Novgorod, Astracan, and Siberia. On that side there was almost no limit to their extension; but in the South and West their progress was arrested by the Tartars of the Crimea, the Turks, the Poles, and the

power of Sweden, any one of which powers was by itself alone more powerful than Russia. The policy to be adopted in such a situation was obvious. The Czars were successful in exciting now the Tartars, and now the Turks, and lastly the Swedes against the Poles, and vicé versâ; and thus, whilst the powers represented at the Congress of Westphalia believed they had established an eternal equilibrium among themselves, a small semi-Asiatic Principality played them the trick of overturning by its rapid increase all their calculations, destroying in a few decisive battles the power of Sweden, interfering in the internal arrangements of Poland, and advancing towards the Danube, so as to become all at once a more formidable rival to Austria than the Turks!

In like manner the Prussian, Austrian, and French dynasties went on increasing their power, first by single-handed conquest, and then by dividing under common agreement the weaker states amongst themselves, and this was called the "equilibrium." The alternative offered to each and all of them was this: "Either divide thy neighbour's territory, or allow thy own to be divided between thy neighbours."

Till the outbreak of the French Revolution not one of the European Kings and Princes—though they pretended to have come into possession of their lands by the grace of God—not one of them was safe for a moment from being dethroned by some plot amongst his brethren. Thus conspiracies and attacks against each other were quite as formidable and determined as in the present day those of the people against them can be; and only those sovereigns who were most daring and regardless of human lives had a chance of keeping their heads above water. Partitioning was till 60 years ago continually in vogue amongst the powers,

not only as regards Poland, but as regards almost all the existing states.

Thus in the year 1791 Austria was as near to being divided between France, Prussia, Bavaria, Spain, and Saxony, as it was in 1648 when the different nations claimed back those members of their different bodies which had been mutilated by the Hapsburgh family. Thus Sweden was actually divided between Russia and Prussia ; and if it had not been so, Prussia would have been divided between Russia and Sweden, rivals of hers. It is only since the great French Revolution made them afraid of the people, that the Princes of Europe have become inspired with that tender regard of each other's sacred rights, which, as was shown, lasts just as long as their dread of the people. The general effect of this dread is to give to the larger powers more safety from the rapacity of their colleagues, and thus to make universal European wars like those of the last century, less likely. But their harmony being only the effect of their fear of the people, it is clear that, under the present political system, a cordial understanding amongst the powers is always equivalent to a complete ascendancy of despotism. For, excepting on the point of popular oppression, there does not and cannot exist any kind of understanding between those powers, inasmuch as they are not political committees but *dynasties* and *military establishments*, ever jealous of each other and in constant fear of their people.

So much then as to the Eastern powers, after Prussia and Russia had inadvertently stepped into the place of Sweden. The Western States of Europe exhibited distinctive features. The sea opened to them all the other parts of the globe for the exercise of their national energies ; and what was quite as important, they were inhabited either entirely by the same race, or at least,

22 *England's Maritime Policy. Basis of the "System."*

as is the case of England, by a people founded on the decided prevalence of one race over its lesser neighbours, and therefore the inhabitants of these countries felt themselves *nations*, which gave them an immense moral and political superiority over the Italian and German sovereignties included in Austria and Prussia. Immediately after the peace of Westphalia there were, besides France, still three other formidable rivals to England, viz., Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands; but it would lead me too far to show the reasons by which these three powers were disabled from sustaining the contest.

It was between France and England that the great battle for the dominion of the seas was fought; and however foolish that war may appear to the present more enlightened age, I think that, as commercial interests were then understood by all nations, England would have had to fight for every separate freight of colonial goods against Spanish, French, Portuguese and Dutch pirates, had she not made up her mind to establish once for all her dominion over them, both in the colonies and on the sea. Now to divide the powers and resources of France, England fomented or took part in all the Continental wars against that power, in which Austria, the old rival of France for the possession of the German and Italian Principalities, was the natural ally of Great Britain.

Having advanced so far in our historical survey, you will now be able to understand the general basis of the present political system of Europe, which bears the name of the system of the balance of power. The centre of the system is formed by the small German and Italian Principalities, which holding out a perpetual temptation of aggrandisement to their Eastern and Western neighbours, are the objects of the secret or open

attacks of Austria, Prussia, and France. Whatever, therefore, the temporary deviations of individual rulers or diplomatists may be, their policy on the whole, prescribed as it is by their reciprocal situations, and by the dynastic and military character of their States, is ruled by laws as unalterable as those of the heavenly bodies. France, whatever may be her professions of peace at any time, will as little give up the idea of having a right to domineer over Italy, Spain, and the left bank of the Rhine, including Belgium, as the Pope will ever give up the idea of re-conquering his spiritual dominion over the world. Austria, on the other hand, although unwilling to extend her dominions, which in their present extent are troublesome enough to keep, will never allow France to execute her ambitious projects upon the German and Italian Principalities, and thus must become aggressive in self-defence against France as well as Prussia; for the latter power manifestly covets the rest of Germany. But why, you ask, should Austria not allow France to take the whole of Italy, and divide Germany between herself and Prussia? For the very good reason, that the next move would be, of course, a partition of Austria herself between Prussia, France, and Russia.

Such are the laws of the central combination of the European system; besides which there is an Eastern and a Western combination, constituted by the mutual relations between Prussia, Austria, and Russia on the one side, and by those between England and France on the other. Moreover there is a general combination of the three Eastern against the two Western powers.

The details of the whole system will be explained in my Third Lecture. For the present it is enough to bear in mind that Austria, France, and Prussia are eternal

24 *Position of France at the End of the last Century.*

rivals with regard to the petty sovereignties of the European centre, and that those three great powers are again shut up between England and Russia, in the same manner as the Principalities of Germany and Italy are enclosed between France, Prussia, and Austria.

When, at the end of the last century, England threatened to drive France back from the sea, whilst Austria no longer stood against her as a single rival, but was, since the partition of Poland and the Revolutions, backed by the powers of Prussia and Russia, the truth flashed upon France that since the peace of Westphalia the world had extended its range. The colossal frame of the Eastern Steppes had, in a little more than one hundred years, been filled up with the sombre image of Russia; the indefinite expanse of the seas and transmarine countries had assumed a distinct shape, and bore on its front the name of the British Empire. Thus, whilst the power of expanding and increasing was unbounded in the case of Russia and England, France was to be shut up with Prussia and Austria in that old narrow Battle-field of the European Continent, which, by comparison with political fortunes of such greatness, had lost the better part of its attractiveness. France made tremendous efforts to escape the degradation of falling into a second-rate power, and she makes them still. Nothing less than dominion over the whole Continent could have made her an Empire at all proportionate to the magnitude of English and Russian success.

It is difficult, therefore, to understand with what show of reason Napoleon could be accused of disturbing the European equilibrium, by raising his Empire to the size of the two great rivals of France. Nor do I see on what principle of right the Continental Sovereigns

reclaimed from the conqueror possessions which, as long as historical recollection goes, had continually passed from hand to hand by the same right of conquest or fraud and, in short, of success, which was the only title-deed to them. The partition of Poland and Sweden had only very recently been effected by them, and but for the wholesome fear of the French they would have continued to do exactly the same thing to each other which they affected to find monstrously criminal in Napoleon, and to which alone they were indebted for their own sovereignties. It was certainly not the Sovereigns who had a right to complain, although the people certainly had. They felt the overbearing arrogance of the French more intolerable than that of their native despots, so intolerant indeed that they forgot all the sufferings entailed upon them by the ambition and extravagance of the latter, while the feeling of their nationality, which had been buried for hundreds of years, was roused by the oppression of the foreigner.

I explained to you how, in consequence of the early division of Germany and Italy into numberless chief-tainships, and still more in consequence of the wars between Austria and France, and especially of the thirty years' war, the spirit of those nations had been broken, and they had been changed into brute instruments for dynastic purposes, toiling away to pay their taxes, and fighting away to keep up the balance between their masters. Unfortunately now, when the national spirit awoke in consequence of foreign oppression, the interests of the princes and the people were so identical in their immediate object, that the colours of the dynasties became the standard around which the people actually rallied for the conquest of their national freedom. They did not reflect at the moment upon

the incompatible nature of the two things, viz., of the existence of great and free nations, and that of numberless sovereign dynasties under the law of the European equilibrium. An undistinguishing enthusiasm for the restoration of both at the same time had seized upon the minds of the most advanced liberals; and considering the perfect slavery and political isolation in which the subjects of those petty states had been kept since the thirty years' war, the revival of the national instinct, feeble though it might be, was all that could be expected. As to the princes themselves they knew as little what they were about as the nations. The Emperor Alexander was a well-meaning but still more vain and fickle enthusiast; King Frederick William of Prussia meant neither good nor ill, but followed throughout his life the mean instincts of a selfish and cowardly disposition. He was only carried away for a time by the noble enthusiasm of his Queen Louisa, of Baron Stein, and of the party which the latter two had amongst the generals, the professors, and the students. Yet that party would not have been strong enough to conquer his base cowardice if the misfortunes of Napoleon's army in Russia had not given him courage. Against this alliance of unenlightened enthusiasm with weakness and cowardice stood a formidable array of the most profound and malignant diplomatists of any age. Count Nesselrode on the part of Russia, Prince Metternich for Austria, Prince Talleyrand for France, and Viscount Castlereagh for England. The part which each of these diplomatists played in the history of our age may be characterised by the sayings for which they became celebrated.

It was Prince Talleyrand's maxim that "words were made to conceal our thoughts." Prince Metternich, who was too clever not to see sometimes through the

absurdities of that system of European order of which he was nevertheless the representative, was heard to adopt the reckless saying of Louis XV.—“Après moi le deluge.” To the same effect was Lord Castlereagh’s last exclamation—“It is all of no use;” and lastly, Count Nesselrode is not known to have betrayed his real mind by any similar expression at any time—a certain proof that he is the greatest diplomatist of all.

Now all these four masters of their art were agreed in maintaining the political system which had been laid down at the peace of Westphalia, and the basis of which, as I think, I have sufficiently shown was the maintenance of the centre of Europe in a state of dismemberment. For if the nations were reunited in strong and free bodies the dynasties must, as a matter of course, be swept away, and with them all the hosts of functionaries, officers, and gendarmes, that were as much interested as the dynasties themselves in the maintenance of that dismemberment.

I have explained how the general tendency of the history of the last three or four hundred years, and of the present political system was to make the central sovereigns dependent upon France, Austria and Prussia, and France, Austria and Prussia again upon England and Russia. It was only what might have been expected, that the smaller and greater powers would make every possible effort to escape such a fatality; but then they were, as the saying is, placed between two fires. The central part of the Continent can never be strong unless the two great central nations, the German and the Italian, are restored. Rather than be absorbed in Germany and Italy, Prussia and Austria were ready to submit to be dependent on Russia.

The treaties then of 1815, although continuing the political system established in 1648, differ from those

of Westphalia in one material point. At the Congress of 1648 the different generals and chiefs of states, demoralized as they and the people had become by the effects of thirty years' civil war, had divided the people among themselves without knowing better. In those times states were contended for avowedly for the sake of securing the private purposes of some mighty families. But at Vienna the contracting parties stood in the face of nations, loudly reclaiming their unity as nations and their rights as free men, although not clear regarding the means of realizing either. The treaties therefore of Vienna were a derision of the public conscience and of the solemnly given promise of restoring to the nations the inalienable birthrights of liberty and national independence.

As though in mockery of that sacred pledge, a statistical Commission was appointed by the Congress to count the square miles and heads of the people of Europe, to serve as a proper basis for their partition amongst the reigning families. Thus Prussia, in exchange for three millions of people which she had possessed in Poland and the North-west of Germany, received in 1815 three other millions in the South-west and centre, which till then had belonged to such a number of larger and smaller territories that it would take half an hour to enumerate them. In the same manner thirty-two other dynastic establishments were re-constructed by the common consent of the diplomats, the people being treated as mere appendages to the ground, whilst nearly 400 smaller sovereigns were deprived of their divine right in spite of their solemn protest. And since, if there is any such thing as the legitimate possession of men, the right of the smallest of those princes was as divine, and his sovereignty as legitimate, as those of the Emperors of Russia

and Austria ; it follows that if the Emperors of Russia and Austria did not respect the legitimacy of hundreds of European dynasties, it cannot be reasonably demanded from the people of the Continent to respect that of those Emperors or of any of their colleagues. In whatever light you may consider the order of 1815, it is a monstrous iniquity. The balance of power then remained entirely true to the spirit in which it was originally conceived. A number of smaller dynasties were again victimised as in the peace of Westphalia ; France and Austria divided again the supremacy of Italy between themselves, and as in the peace of Westphalia three great powers made the petty German sovereigns the stake of their diplomatic game ; in short, nothing was altered in the character of either the internal government or the external relations of the people of the Continent by the arrangements of Vienna, excepting that the system of injustice was enlarged and confirmed. Thus Russia, after having acquired by far the greater part of Poland, and having occupied Bessarabia, had taken a commanding position against Austria and Prussia, and through them against the central sovereigns ; and England, by establishing her dominions over the seas, had reduced France to an ambiguous position between a first-rate and a second-rate power. The whole of Europe had thus finally become degraded into mere *material* for the diplomatic consumption of the two outer powers—the only powers of Europe who since 1815 can be said to maintain an independent position, viz. Russia and England ; so that at present the unhappy people of the centre of Europe have not only to defray the expenses of their own courts and armies of soldiers, functionaries and policemen, but have also to fight the diplomatic battles of France, Austria, and Prussia ; and the people of France,

30 *Value of abstract Principles. The English Cure-all.*

Austria, and Prussia, have in their turn to defray the contest between Russia and England, and to fight their battles not only at the expense of their property, but of their moral health, their liberty, and their national independence and greatness.

Such is the celebrated order of Europe—the order established by the treaties of Westphalia and Vienna, and renewed and re-confirmed but yesterday. I shall make it the subject of a subsequent Lecture to show in detail, that the system embodied in those treaties is the permanent cause of despotism, revolution, and war, and must, if not broken up in time, end in the general ruin of Europe. The object of my present Lecture has merely been to expose the *atheism* of its principle. By atheism I mean the utter absence of any of our common ideas of right and morality in the foundation of those so-called states and in their treaties with each other. Some people do not reflect upon the entire absence of any principle of right in the existence of those family establishments. Others, who think themselves practical men, consider such ideal notions of very little consequence for good government; they believe that common sense and moderation may replace them all with advantage. Yet the very history of those states which have made the experiment of getting on without any of those ideal principles ought to teach them that there is *no getting on* without them.

It is natural in men to judge of the affairs of others by analogies drawn from their own position: thus it is natural that Englishmen should judge the case of the Continent by comparing it with their own. So Englishmen generally recommend to the people of the Continent to work patiently and gradually at the introduction and confirmation of *representative institutions* in the different states; whilst they ridicule their

attempts at national liberty as sentimental nonsense and vague idealism. But if I have succeeded in explaining to you the real state of things, you will now be aware that in that idealism questions of a thoroughly practical character are involved. I am far from wishing to be a mere apologist of idealism. It is my feeling that what is good and right is good and right without being in need of a passport from the office of utilitarianism. I believe that a mother who loves her child, and a son who loves his father, are not to be laughed at for indulging in such merely ideal fancies, although they should not make a penny by it. I believe that these feelings are the best things we have; and if they come into conflict with our material interests, there can be no question amongst us which of the two are to be sacrificed. I hold that national feeling is one of those things which occupies the next place to our family attachments in the minds of all unsophisticated men. It is even my conviction that the most theoretically determined cosmopolitan or utilitarian in England will, if put to the test, be found to thank Providence in his heart that he is an Englishman—and not a Frenchman, a Portuguese or a Negro. Nevertheless, he will sit down and write an article in the *Edinburgh Review* declaring that Joseph Mazzini, being a Genoese by birth, had no business to trouble himself with the affairs of Rome. Is it, then, to be supposed that those who write such and similar things on the national struggles of the Continent dwell in raptures on the age when the man who lived on the right bank of the Trent considered the inhabitant of the left bank as a foreigner and as a natural enemy? There once was such a state of things in this island, and the consequence was that it fell an easy prey to the foreigner, and was made for hundreds of years the theatre of war and desolation. For, a

people who have no *national* character to maintain invite the foreigner to insult, to enslave, and to debase them; that is the first practical point which is involved in national idealism. There was another time, in this island, when it was divided into seven little kingdoms, Saxon and English. Suppose those seven little kingdoms were still extant, suppose each of them enjoyed a representative government, working as well and cherished as much by the people of each of those seven sovereignties as that which the British Empire at present enjoys. There can be no doubt that travellers from the United States of America would be exceedingly pleased to find the seven little peoples of those seven little states getting on so quietly and behaving so well. Each of those seven little peoples would be very proud of their own institutions and of their own empire. There would be a strong Essex feeling and a strong Wessex feeling, but there would be no English feeling, no England, and no such a being as an Englishman.

Those who enjoy the blessing of being members of a great nation are very apt to overlook how much of what gives sturdy independence, firmness, and energy to their individual character is the gift of their national feeling. They are like those who enjoying pure air boast of their health. Why is it that the Germans, who were originally of the same blood as the English, are at present so much behind them in steadiness and force of character? And why are the modern Italians as ill reputed for their effeminacy as the ancient Romans were proverbial for their sternness and virtue? Because a people who have no national character to maintain are like an individual who has no private character to maintain—without self-respect and without the respect of others. The feeling, therefore, which since the beginning of this century has prompted the Conti-

mental people to engage in a struggle for their national recovery is to be hailed as a re-awakening of self-respect, after a long period of sluggish apathy and contemptible indifference to their own characters. And such re-awakening of self-respect is in itself the highest purpose, whilst it is at the same time the indispensable preliminary of any practical improvement of their condition ; and this is the second practical point which is involved in national idealism.

Again, I have supposed that seven or nine Anglo-Saxon kingdoms still existed in this island, and that their institutions were as enlightened, and worked as well as those which the whole kingdom at present enjoys. But I have supposed an impossibility. Every war which England has gone through would have had to have been waged—every reform which has been carried, would have had to have been carried seven or nine times at seven or nine different places. To point out only one thing: what difficulties would there have been to overcome, what jealousies to appease, what monopolies to conquer, before two of the little states would have agreed to establish a free exchange of their products amongst themselves ! And with such barriers in the interior of this island your trade and industry would never have arrived, as they have done, to such a height that the necessity of abolishing all restrictions should have only become evident from having become imperious. In short, you would be some hundreds of years back in your civilization but for national unity. A people who have no national character to maintain are thwarted in their material prosperity and general progress and civilization. This is the third practical point involved in the question of national unity.

Again, with respect to representative institutions. Admitting that a people who are thwarted in energy,

in self-respect, in material prosperity, and in general civilization—admitting, for the sake of argument, that such a people could have representative institutions of a kind worth having, let us suppose your seven little kingdoms transplanted into the centre of Europe, and surrounded by Prussia, Austria, and France. What follows? Why,—if the King of Essex wishes to maintain his petty independence against Austria, he favours French liberal ideas for the sake of engaging the interest of France in the cause of his sovereignty. In that juncture the Chambers resound with liberal speeches. If the King of Essex is afraid of French ambition, he dissolves his Chamber, and puts the liberal members into prison, in order to engage the interest of Austria in the cause of his sovereignty. In that juncture the representative institutions are sent to the House of Correction. Under whatever juncture, they are a mockery; for a people who have no national character to maintain cannot be really free, whatever may be the name of their institutions; and this is the fourth practical point involved in the question of nationality.

But there are points still more immediately practical, still more pressing and directly diplomatic, which make the question of national restoration as it were the hinge on which the salvation or ultimate destruction of the present Continental states and European civilization must turn. I have hitherto only dwelt on historical generalities, and on questions rather ideal, just because it is my opinion that there are no practical questions which are not ideal. Reflect on this vast tableau of which I have ventured to give you only such a sketch as can be drawn for a public assembly and delivered in a short hour.

What after all have been the results of the tremendous efforts of all the great practical diplomatists of the

last 300 years? Have the states been preserved which they employed such incredible pains to constitute? Have the few states which actually were preserved by them become powerful? Have the people been kept in quiet subjection under the measures devised by the boasted wisdom of those thoroughly practical politicians? Why, in every single point this boasted wisdom, this practical skill, this incredible expenditure of ingenuity, has defeated its own object! On this as on every other of her pages, history teaches us, indeed, that those broad principles of common morality, at which cunning selfishness smiles, are the only truly practical principles in political as well as private matters; that it is those ideal principles—the principles of right and liberty, of nationality and human brotherhood—which are driving mankind irresistibly onward, as the thorn is driven irresistibly inward to unfold the sweet beauty of the rose—which are secretly operating at the bottom of all political combinations—which dissolve all diplomatic treaties, although concluded under the guarantee of millions of bayonets—which have allowed states and dynasties to rise out of the universal empire of the Middle Ages, but to hurry them into destruction after having made them the unwilling instruments of preparing a more perfect realization of individual independence, a more friendly intercourse between free nations, and a nearer approach to universal peace, than the attempt of Charlemagne was able to accomplish!

LECTURE II.

DESPOTISM AND REVOLUTION.

Working of the System upon the *Internal Conditions* of the different Continental States since 1815.—Prince Metternich. (Austria and England compared).—France under her different Governments.—Prussia.

I SAID in my last Lecture that there was no principle, no morality, no right, no religion of any kind or description in the treaties of 1815. They are not sacred treaties. The princes who made them assumed a right which did not belong to them. They contracted about the people, counting their heads as so many heads of cattle, and said,—There Hapsburgh, so many millions for you ; and there Hohen-Zollern, so many millions for you. Where was the right ? A doctrine had been got up from the very beginning of this modern order of things, i. e., from about 300 years ago—a doctrine that the kings were appointed by a special dispensation from above, as the private possessors of all the lands and people which, by poison or the sword, by fraud or violence, they had been able to collect together. The diplomatists of 1815 affected to believe in that doctrine of legitimacy ; but whilst affecting to believe in it, they deprived about 400 smaller sovereigns of their territories. By this act they proved that the doctrine of legitimacy was a mere pretext, and was not believed by themselves. For if the right of princes is derived

from heaven, the larger or smaller extent of their territories cannot make any difference in its inviolability. The case is then this—about fifty princes set at nought the principles of legitimacy, as binding upon them, in some four hundred cases: i. e., they declared four hundred times over that there was no such thing as a personal or family right in the government of men. Yet they presumed, on the supposition of such a right, to barter about the people of Europe, and to guarantee to each other for all eternity so many heads of people!

The fact is, then, that the treaties of 1815 are a profound juggle, as were those of 1648. But those who call themselves practical men will say, that right is one thing, and wisdom is another. That since the treaties of 1815 are a fact, we ought to acknowledge them; that it is always better to have an imperfect order than no order at all; and that in absence of any other principle of international right, those treaties are the only thing that we can go by. Now there is no one more ready than the Lecturer to acknowledge the argument, that a political constitution, whether that of a single country, or one established between a number of independent governments, is not to be rejected and overthrown at once on account of its imperfections—on account of its not coming up to a certain exalted standard of social happiness and human right. The perfect cannot be realized in one day. Man is not made to have any good thing but by work, patient work, and plenty of it. But the order of which we are speaking here is not reprehensible on account of its imperfections. It is all but perfect in wickedness. It is not only wrong, but it is known to be wrong by those who live upon it. It is a deliberate fraud. The diplomats know very well that there is no such thing as a divine right of monarchs. No adept of the sacred

order of diplomacy ever has the least doubt that diplomacy is the art of cheating each other and the people. If such a state of things—if an order based upon such principles could be productive of anything but mischief, the only thing remaining for a man of sense, would be to worship the devil, and to laugh in his sleeve at the fools who believe—

“That virtue is no name, and happiness no dream.”

But, fortunately! the treaties of 1815, which are only an enlargement of those of 1648, are productive of nothing but mischief. I say, fortunately! because the evils they engender, the political earthquakes of which they are the source, the destruction of human life, the dissolution of all social bonds which are the fruits of this admirable order—the serene tranquillity, the beautiful peace—all these things but indicate the eternal truth—that a man cannot gather grapes from thorns nor figs from thistles.

Let us look at the condition of the European states. Nothing could prove more satisfactorily than that condition proves, that every violation of human right is infallibly visited with its adequate punishment. The great powers of Europe are five—England and Russia, Austria, France, and Prussia. England has, like every other great power, extended her dominion by conquest. I need not tell you what troubles those conquests have given her. I need not tell you, because your present policy shows that you know it better than any one could tell you. The policy of England has been for many years past to overcome by justice and liberty the consequences of former wrongs; and, most fortunately for her, those wrongs have never been so great as to attack the vital parts of her organism. Both the national and social basis of England are sound; and I

trust that soundness will overcome all the weakness of the superstructure. But I am sorry to say, both the national and social basis of the Continental states are unsound. Of Russia I will not speak in this Lecture, because politically and socially speaking that people are only just in the process of formation. The states which can be said to be the entire creatures of the political system embodied in the treaties of Vienna, are the remaining Continental states, and amongst them, Austria, France, and Prussia as the *leading* powers.

Now to understand what Austria really is, you will do well to call to mind that Europe is inhabited chiefly by three great races; viz., the Romanic race, comprising the Southern people of Europe, the inhabitants of Spain, Italy, and the greater part of France; the Teutonic race, which occupies England, Scotland, Germany, Holland, part of Denmark, part of Belgium, part of France, part of Switzerland, part of Austria, almost all Prussia, and a part of Russia. The third chief race of Europe is the Slavic, which is spread over the greater part of European Russia, while the Poles of Prussia, and Austria, the Tzechs of Bohemia, the Slovaks, the Croats, the Slavonians and Dalmatians of Austria, the Serbians, and by far the majority of the people of the Turkish empire and of Greece are different branches of the same Slavic race. These three races comprise almost the whole population of Europe. Only the Magyars form as it were a small island of people in the midst of the surrounding Slaves and Germans, with whom they stand in no kind of blood relationship;—and besides them, there are the Osmanli, the conquerors of Turkey, where they still maintain the unsafe dominion of a very small minority over an immense-majority of indigenous Slaves.

To form for yourselves an idea of the different characters of these three chief races, I need only refer to the analogy of the difference between the English and the Irish. In spite of having been united for centuries in the same empire, the Irish speak a language altogether distinguished from the English language. Whilst the English as a rule are Protestants, the Irish are Catholics; the latter are of a sanguine disposition; the Englishman's temperament is choleric. In short, they are each stamped by the hand of nature with features so decidedly opposed to the other, that a complete amalgamation seems almost impossible. In the same manner, the religion of the Teutonic race is, as a rule, the Protestant one, whilst the Romanic nations are Catholics; and the Slaves, with the exception of the Poles and the Croats, belong to the Greek church. The case of the English and Irish, however, presents this distinctive feature, that the one of the two races is by far less energetic than the other, and is confined to an island of small dimensions. But on the Continent the Romanic, the Teutonic, and the Slavic races, with features quite as distinct from each other as those of the Anglo-Saxons are from the Celts, are extended over such vast regions, that never could one of those races think of keeping in constant and entire subjection any one of the two others. At different periods of history attempts have been made by the Romanic race to conquer the Teutonic, and by the Teutonic race to conquer the Romanic or the Slavic. In fact, all European history, since the times of Cæsar, is made up of such attempts. But the result has always been that, as a whole, the conquered race have soon recovered their independence; although parts of the Slavic and Romanic people have at all times been kept in subjection by parts of the Germans;

and parts of the Germans are at present under the sway of Romanic France and Sclavic Russia.

The very least reflection on this state of things will at once convince you that it is not a question of representative institutions which constitutes the great difficulty of the Continent. In fact, those paragons of wisdom who constantly admonish the people and governments of the Continent to imitate the example of the English Constitution, prove nothing but their own ignorance on the real difficulties of the Continental people. Suppose England were closely surrounded by three or four such provinces as Ireland, each of those four provinces, moreover, being inhabited by a different race of people, and each of those four different peoples being backed from without by a powerful mass of kindred tribes; and all this in the midst of Continental Europe—I defy any of the sternest apostles of constitutional wisdom and moderation, if he were called to the throne of such an empire, to govern it after the pattern of the English Constitution. Such, however, is the exact case of Austria. Austria is composed of members of all the three great races of Europe, and not only of the three great ones, but in addition, of the isolated and energetic race of the Magyars, and all kinds of smaller particles of national wrecks are wrought up with that monstrous establishment. Each of these dissevered members of mighty races hates all the others with whom it is chained together as cordially as the Celt hates the Anglo-Saxon. Each of them, with the exception of the Magyars, is backed by the whole bulk of its brethren in Russia, in Turkey, in Italy, in Germany, and in Poland. And not only is each race supported by the fanaticism of race on the part of its brethren, but also by the fanaticism of religion, some looking to the Pope as their spiritual chief, others to

the Greek Patriarch, others to the Russian Czar, and others again to the King of Prussia, as the head of the Continental Protestants. With these elements of mischief already at work, the Russian Czar, the King of Prussia, and the Government of France are always on the watch to add, at the proper moment, fuel to the flame ! Such is Austria. The Hapsburgh family had crammed itself with every variety of territory and people, never caring what people they were, and now they are sticking in its throat—for example, There is in the North-east of the Austrian empire, a piece of Poland, forming the Austrian province of Galicia ; and in the North-west the province of Bohemia, where Germans and Tzechs are devouring each other—the Tzechs being a branch of the Sclavic race, like the Poles. Then there is the kingdom of Hungaria. If it were merely peopled by the race of Magyars, it would be troublesome enough to govern ; but the Magyars are all surrounded in their own Hungarian kingdom by several branches of the Sclavic and Romanic races, at war with each other, but united for the most part in their hatred against their ancient conqueror, the proud Magyar. There is again the slice which Austria has cut off from Italy—the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. Recent sad events bear testimony, as many a struggle before has done, and many a tragedy yet will tell, by what links this unhappy people are tied to the Austrian empire ! And in the centre of all this empire lies a small German domain, as the ruling power, but divided in itself, between a party who would keep the dominion over the varied plunder of so many races, and a party who would only be too glad to escape from this palace of mutilated national members, plastered with blood, into the arms of a free German people. Now propose to the Emperor of Austria representative institutions, if

you please! If the foaming and rampant populations of the Austrian provinces were each a complete race, or were separated by an ocean, and by entirely new connections from their kin in other countries, the proposition of governing Austria like England would be a little less absurd than it actually is. But, in the case of the Hapsburgh estate, each of the provinces is closely backed by an innumerable host of its brethren of the same race without: there is no geographical gap, nay, rarely anything like a geographical line between the Poles of Austria and the Poles of Russia and Prussia; between the Roumains of Austria and of Moldavlachia; between the Serves and Sclavonians of Austria and the Serves and Sclavonians of Turkey; between the Italians of Austria, and the Italians of Piedmont, Rome and Naples; between the Germans of Austria and the Germans of Bavaria, Russia, and other states. What kind of policy could be possibly adopted to keep such a state together? None but that which has been actually adopted by the Austrian rulers, and which offers a choice between three measures. In the first case, artificial lethargy; if that should prove no longer maintainable, an artificial equilibrium of the government between the jealousies of the different races; and if ultimately those jealousies should become unmanageable, and break out into active war, why then, the chances of war to re-conquer one province by the assistance of the other. The two former of these systems were combined in the policy of Prince Metternich. The last has been adopted by the present Austrian government. Austria, if she would exist at all, has evidently only the chance between Metternichism and Haynauism.

Only imagine that Metternich had conceived in 1815 the insane plan of calling together the representatives of

all the Austrian provinces. In the first case, all the Poles, the Italians, the Slaves, the Magyars, and even a strong party of the Germans, would have protested against such an assembly, attendance at which they would have considered a voluntary abdication of their different nationalities in favour of the House of Hapsburgh. But suppose they had been prevailed upon to come, they would have formed in the Imperial Parliament, a Polish, a Hungarian, a Slavonic, a German, and an Italian brigade, each of such brigades appealing to, and being applauded by, the whole of Poland, of Italy, of Germany, of Russia, and of Turkey!

Now, as every thing which has its beginning has its progress, the ultimate result of such an insane trick—insane in the sense of the interests of the House of Hapsburgh and the other Continental Houses—the ultimate result must inevitably have been a general rising of the great races of Europe for the overthrow of the dynasties and for the restoration of their nationalities.

It is true that such will after all be the ultimate result, yet to give the signal for the overthrow of Austria was a thing not to be demanded from the prime minister of the Austrian monarchy, and the chief framers of the treaties of Vienna. An honest man would not take upon himself the office of an Austrian prime minister. But an Austrian prime minister had no other choice than, on the one hand, to divert the attention of the subjects of the empire most carefully from all matters of political or national interest; and on the other hand, to endeavour to make the governments of Russia, Prussia, and France, afraid of the national and liberal spirit of their own subjects. For, if the Emperor Alexander of Russia were liberal to

the Poles, the Austrian Poles would of course become excited, and call for a re-union with the Russian Poles. If the King of Prussia were disposed to introduce representative institutions in his dominions, all the other Germans, including those of Austria, would become enthusiastic for the King of Prussia. As to France, it was well known that every word of freedom spoken in the Chambers, found an echo in the heart of all the European people, but more particularly in that of the Italians.

Whenever, therefore, as much as a sigh for liberty was heard in any of the Continental countries, a Congress of all the great powers was instantly convoked by Prince Metternich, for the suppression of that sigh, before it might rise into a cry of insurrection. And whenever no such sigh had been heard for some time, a diplomatic Congress was nevertheless convoked by Prince Metternich for the suppression of the sigh which had not been heard! What I am stating here is only too true. It is a fact that conspiracies were invented. The governments were to be kept in constant fear of their peoples, for the understanding between those governments and their peoples would have been dangerous to Austria. At the same time the people of Austria were to be kept in profound ignorance of the world beyond the walls of that second China. The people were encouraged to laugh, to dance, to sing, to eat, to drink, to be merry and enjoy themselves, and to love their emperor, who, it was daily repeated, had no other desire than to see them happy. Vienna became renowned as the most delightfully enervating resort of amusement in Europe. The tragedies of the great German and English poets—of Schiller, Goethe, and Shakspeare, were banished from the imperial stage. They were too manly! But farces, redundant with

equivocal jokes, and dramas of a mawkish sentimentality, enjoyed the patronage of the authorities. The people *were* happy. Can a government do more than make a people happy? The lovers of enlightened despotism say, No! I say, Yes! There you have a government which made its people happy by enervating them, which claimed the gratitude of men for having trained them in Sybaritism, which offered them the choice between moral degradation and the gaol. The law of Austria was, "Be happy, but be not a man—be happy, but do not speak, do not read, do not hear, do not see, do not think, excepting what is puerile, frivolous, and obscene." Political matters were, of course, excluded from the Austrian papers. The people knew as little of what was brewing in their own Cabinet as of the news from France, from England, or from any other state, unless it was, that their majesties the Emperor and Empress of Russia had paid a visit to their majesties the King and Queen of Prussia; and that at the very moment when the imperial guests made their appearance in public, the sun, which until then had been hidden behind a veil of clouds, dutifully stepped forth to acknowledge, by the homage of his most brilliant rays, the honour of their majesties' visit! This was the only kind of political education which the Austrian government considered it for the interest of its children to grant; and I can state, from my own experience, that what we enjoyed in Prussia was essentially the same. In Prussia we were, however, allowed to be regaled with diluted abstracts from foreign news; but in Austria, danger to the existing order of things was scented in the very revellings of frivolity. Only one instance by way of illustration. A pamphlet, entitled "*Cravatiana*," or "*The Art of tying your Cravat*," was suppressed by the censorship, because, amongst

other things, the author had treated of a certain kind of knot, called by the Vienna fashionables, "*à la Riègo*." Now, Riègo had been one of the leaders of the Spanish revolution, and the book was therefore very properly condemned on account of its revolutionary tendency!

What would, I ask, under such a rule, have become of your Shaksperes, your Miltons—all your great poets, historians, divines, orators, and politicians? King Lear would probably have been condemned, because kings must not be supposed to be liable to madness; Paradise Lost, because the censor would no doubt have discovered in the portrait of the arch-fiend a striking allusion to the Austrian chancellor of state. It is a fact, that numbers of books have been almost daily condemned on account of such supposed allusions, which were never intended. But the mischief of such censorship is not so much in the suppression of the books which *have been* written, as of those which *would* have been written, if those who felt any great and generous thoughts stirring within them, had not shrunk from the idea of writing them down, nay, from the thought of thinking them at all! Where would be all your books, your pamphlets, your periodicals, your newspapers, under such a rule? Where your literature, your science, your inventions, your manliness, your political wisdom, your common sense, your honesty, your liberty? Stifled not in their bloom, but in their birth—not in their birth, but in their very conception!

And now I would ask you—you who enjoy the blessing of being a nation—whether there is any reason to be astonished at what is in a great measure falsely considered a want of political wisdom and practical sense, or moral energy, on the part of the people of the Continent? Surely, if anything in their conduct or character is deserving of astonishment, it is this—that in spite of

hundreds of years of war and of paternal government, they have still been able to bring forth *so much* that is great in intellect and art—that they have still preserved so much manliness as to scorn the tender care of those who would plunge them into idiotic sensualism; and so much energy as to be resolved to shake off their infamous chains! Surely, revolution, if wisely matured and carried out at a proper time and in sternness of spirit, is, in such a case, not only pardonable, but is a sacred duty! Others may doubt whether man has a right to be free. It is my opinion, that no man has a right not to be free. No man has a right not to be virtuous, and where there is no freedom there can be no virtue.

In a country where the people are not their own masters, everything, which in a free country is a step towards perfection, is made an instrument of vice and oppression. Education, religion,—the very forms of liberty are turned to the use of despotism, as the devil is said to quote scripture when his own purposes require it. In France, as in Austria and in Prussia, the clergy form a part of the government *machinery*; piety is a trap for catching liberty. In Austria, the priests were obliged to give the police the names of parties who neglected to confess at the appointed times. The confessional was a *police-institution* in order to find out every commencement of a political plot.

It would be rather difficult for those, I should think, who are wont to recommend to the Austrians peaceful efforts and gradual reform, to act up to their own advice, if they were placed under similar circumstances. Let us suppose, for the sake of illustration, Mr. COBDEN had been obliged to demand a written order from the Manchester police, in order to go to Bradford or Halifax to hold an anti-corn-law meeting. Of course,

in speaking of the Manchester police, I do not mean the police as it is in England, but as it is on the Continent—an arbitrary and irresponsible power, set to watch and punish the actions, the words, and even the intentions and thoughts of men. Suppose there had never a word been allowed to be printed in either the Manchester, or the London, or any other newspapers, or in any of the tracts or pamphlets of which the anti-corn-law league poured, day after day, innumerable copies over the country. Suppose, so far from being allowed to deliver a lecture against the sacred corn-laws, imposed upon the people by the ruling powers, the editor of the *League* had been immediately dragged away from his home, and been confined in some secret dungeon for having betrayed to some person or other his opinion that those laws were unjust and ought to be abolished. You perceive that, under such circumstances, there is an end of peaceful agitation. You might as well recommend to a man who is locked up in prison to walk quietly down stairs, instead of risking his neck by jumping out of the window.

How are your reforms accomplished? Of course by first forming a great party of reform. How are a great number of men united *into one* great party? I believe by first speaking and writing for years and years together to make as much as the thought of the necessity of a certain reform familiar to the minds of men; I believe, by forming associations to agree upon the means of removing the obstacles standing in the way of the realization of such reform; I believe, by afterwards stirring up the public mind by means of meetings and lectures, and pamphlets and newspapers, and by eliciting opposition and criticism, and thus causing the theories and plans of the leaders to be purified by the opinions of the whole people. And after all these preparatory

steps have been taken, the representatives of the people are to be addressed, to be worked upon, and, if need be, to be replaced by others; nay, the electors themselves are to be gained over, to be canvassed, and to be augmented by the creation of thousands of new freeholders. All this, you know is necessary to gain as much as a *chance* of carrying a measure of reform: all this freedom of speaking and writing for years against the government, of forming associations against the policy of the government, of holding anti-government meetings, of abusing the government, of abusing your lords and your commons, your constitution, your press, your people, yourselves and the whole world: all this freedom is necessary to obtain as much as a chance of carrying the slightest measure of reform. And if any of those liberties were withheld from you, you would be obliged, as they are on the Continent, to reflect, each man separately on his own account, and in his own way, on the best form of government, and the most perfect society; and there would be as many theories abroad amongst you on those subjects as there are heads in England!

That such a system as the one he upheld was untenable in the long-run, Metternich himself saw better than any other man, and, like Louis XV., he had made up his mind, that after him the deluge of unfettered national hatreds would break upon the empire and on Europe. There was a preliminary to the deluge in 1848 and 1849. At that time, whilst the Magyars, Servs, and Croats slaughtered each other, and the Italians of Austria rose for the emancipation of Italy; whilst the Germans of Austria sent their deputies to Frankfort, and the Tzechs of Austria at the head of the universal Sclavic Congress gave in Prague a three days' battle to Windischgrätz; there was a flock of parrots comfortably perched

on some safe tree, that cried out with indefatigable seriousness to the people of Austria the eternal formula: "Representative institutions." Any one not wholly blind might have seen that the battle fought in Austria was a battle of *races*, a battle not between one people and one government for any particular kind of institutions, excepting so far as the institutions of the Hungarians were the safeguard of their nationality. The fact is, that each of the different races tried to make the government its own ally; and the government took the hint, and conquered them through each other. That is still the present policy of the Austrian government, and must ever remain so, as long as Austria exists. The fortune of Hapsburgh, about which such fine things have been said, blooms out of the sanguinary hatred of its people against each other. If the fortune of the House of Hapsburgh and the preservation of the Austrian monarchy are the ends of Austrian government, then Haynau is only to be praised for resorting to the means necessary for the accomplishment of such ends; but if Haynau and his means are to be disavowed, then the Austrian monarchy and the House of Hapsburgh are to be disavowed too. If peace is the end proposed, it ought to be well considered what the peace of Prince Metternich means for the thirty-seven millions inhabiting the Austrian territories. If, notwithstanding, the blood of those thirty-seven millions is held more precious than their souls, it ought not to be forgotten, that Metternich himself never expected any other ultimate result from his order and tranquillity than the deluge of universal massacre. The fault lies in the *composition* of Austria, and in the European system of which she forms a part; and the only remedy, which I am able to discover, is in a complete re-arrangement on a national basis.

The difficulties of *France* are less of a national than of a social character; but they have been brought about chiefly in consequence of the position which she occupies as a member of the European system. The great mistake, as I said in my first Lecture, which stands in the way of understanding Continental affairs is, to ascribe too much importance to the will and intentions of individual rulers. All that individuals, who accept the system, can do, is either to swim with the stream, or to stem its current for a few years, when the inevitable consequence will be an inundation at last! To speak less figuratively: The Kings of the Continent are as little unlimited as is the Queen of England. The real difference consists not in the limitation of the royal will, but in *the nature of the power* by which that will is limited. In England that power is a combination of the aristocracy and of the middle classes, extending gradually to the whole population. On the Continent it is a body of civil, military, and ecclesiastical *functionaries*. In England, therefore, to govern, means—to reconcile the interests of the different classes and occupations of which the people consist. On the Continent it means—to make the king, the aristocracy, the middle classes, and the people, all equally conducive to the interests of the functionary body. In France that body consists—

1. Of fifty thousand priests, and as many persons of both sexes, belonging to the different religious establishments. This property amounts to twelve million pounds sterling, and they exercise a most powerful influence, particularly upon the rural population. They are never in serious opposition to any kind of government which works honestly at the confirmation of absolutism, and are always the avowed supporters of *declared* absolutism.

2. Of the army, which in France amounts to nearly half a million.

3. Of the administrative body or the bureaucracy. It is difficult for an Englishman to form an idea of what bureaucracy means. Imagine your police were not the servants of the public, but under the direction of a *central government*, appointed to watch and spy over you : suppose your schoolmasters were appointed by the same government to bring up your children in government notions, and that your public works, such as railways, water-works, town-halls, churches, &c., were directed in the same way, by government architects, government inspectors, government-wards, &c. Imagine, besides, a number of functionaries to look into your manufactories and workshops, to see whether the Ten Hours' and other Bills are strictly observed, whether any law or tax is evaded, whether you do not hurt yourselves and do no mischief to others ! Suppose you had five hundred thousand such functionaries in England, paid by the state, hierarchically organized and strictly disciplined, and you will have an idea of the formidable sort of power which is in France, Prussia, and Austria, at the disposal of the government, over and above the army and the clergy ! Add to this the mayors and town councils, for the government exercises in all Continental states an irresistible control, either directly or indirectly, over such appointments. Add, lastly, the different courts of justice and of arbitration, which are more or less liable to become political tools, and you will recognise that absolutism does by no means reside in the individual *person* of the king, but in a formidable *order* of above one million of officials, partly civil, partly military, and partly ecclesiastical. Now reflect, how this one million

of officials stands affected to the thirty-five millions of Frenchmen remaining.

There are in France twenty-five millions of people who are either painfully struggling for a scanty subsistence, or are absolute paupers. There remain, then, ten millions in easy or moderate circumstances, or such as gain a decent livelihood. Of the former twenty-five millions the great majority are incredibly ignorant, superstitious, and wretched : four millions out of their number belonging to the dangerous classes of society. There remain, then, only the latter ten millions at all in a condition to form a steady counterpoise to the functionary power. But again, from these ten millions, those who belong to the families of the officials are to be subtracted—say it is one million. Of the remaining nine millions the fourth part, or two and a quarter millions, are males between fifteen and fifty years of age, i. e., of the same average age with the soldiers and civil officials. It results, that for nearly every two vigorous men of the intellectual, educated, and not more or less starving part of the population, there is in France one functionary of some sort.

But the non-functionary population are split into a variety of parties by the natural diversity of their occupations, interests, and social positions, as well as by their political past. There are Legitimists, Orleanists, Republicans, and Socialists. On the other hand, the whole body of the government's servants is organised after one plan, disciplined for one purpose, inspired with one feeling, and living in one circle of traditions. It is, indeed, absurd to imagine that such a force, constituted in such a manner, and with a history of four hundred years' standing, would yield without resistance to the pressure of any individual will or party interest excepting its own. The old nobility of France tried

under Louis XVIII. to wield the power of this ponderous machine, but the bureaucracy and the army, which under Napoleon I. had been all-powerful, despised the incapacity and administrative ignorance of the nobles who pretended to govern them. They let them fall in the Revolution of July. They then made an agreement with the stockjobbers, and with Louis Philippe, to govern and plunder the people in common. But Louis Philippe's foreign policy, although it flattered the funds, did not flatter the army nor the clergy. And so, when the King of July quarrelled with the July bankers, the military and ecclesiastical orders kept neutral, and the people, coming down into the streets, carried the day, having hardly any adversary to fight with but the old king's individual person. There remained, then, on the twenty-fourth of February, the men on the exchange, who found all on a sudden that there was no extensive industrial class in France to back them, and that they had been very stupid to quarrel with the king. There were on the other hand the peasants and workmen of France: the latter being an intelligent but excitable body; the former besotted, and at times fanatic.

Now, the incredible amount of misery in France had set many benevolent or ambitious intellects on the track of finding an immediate release from her social evils. They have indoctrinated the masses with their views. The more intelligent part of the masses—the workmen of the large towns—have, with much good sense, picked out the practical part of their doctrines. But the number of industrial labourers is very inconsiderable in France. The great majority (four-sixths) of the whole population are peasants, and the majority of those peasants are paupers. It cannot be demanded from such a multitude to reflect on the refined specu-

lations of Louis Blanc and Proudhon. They cannot even read; how then could they be expected to derive any but the very grossest notions from the teachings of the socialist propaganda. By socialism they understand, on the whole, that M. Barbès will take one million from the rich and divide it amongst them.

On the other hand the rich men of France, the great proprietors, bankers, and manufacturers, have never used the political power which they enjoyed under Louis Philippe with any view to the improvement of the condition of the masses. That untiring and searching activity with which every social evil is attended to in this country by both the aristocracy and the middle classes, is unknown to the French bourgeois. The French bourgeoisie is, as a rule, a reckless money-hunting class; and the government of Louis Philippe was one of systematic corruption—the government lavishing the public resources in buying the majority of the Chamber. Such a system did comparatively little harm in England under Sir Robert Walpole, when the riches of all the world streamed together to create a large class of small commercial and industrial people, and of intelligent workmen. But in a poor country, where the broad basis of those two classes is entirely wanting, two Chambers instituted for legalizing bribery, stock-jobbing, and monopoly, could only create an irremediable breach between the enjoying minority and the suffering majority of the people. There is nothing to fill up this breach now, but the clergy, the administration, and the army. This power has stepped finally in to assume the reins of government, and this power will henceforth be the ruling power of France. If there had been no Louis Napoleon, they would have found another chief to do their business.

I do not see what other kind of government is possible in France. The government of the Legitimists fell for ever in France when money was found to be more powerful than landed property; the government of the monied-men has alike fallen for ever in 1848, since the peasant masses have been called to the exercise of political rights. Lastly, the government of those masses is as impossible as that of the Legitimists or the Orleanists, because no government can give immediate relief to their universal misery, nor hold out to them a reasonable chance of a palpable and lasting improvement of their situation. There remains, then, only *force*—the force of superstition, of espionage, of arms. France is actually arrived at the state of ancient Rome, where the armies made and unmade their emperors. Louis Napoleon would be happy, indeed, if he could get rid of the chief who made him; but that chief won't go.* The only difference between modern France and ancient Rome is this, that Rome had none to help her; whilst at present there are other civilized countries besides France. It is generally supposed that the other countries of the Continent will have to receive their liberty from France. The fact is, that it is only from other countries that France can possibly receive her liberty; i. e., if ever the existing state of things should give way to a more natural arrangement. France can only make revolutions, not bring liberty. But if peace, real order, and material development should ever be established in Italy, Germany, Hungary, and Poland, the prosperity and liberty of those countries would naturally re-act favourably upon the social and political condition of France. Such is the only chance for that country. In her interior conditions,

* This was written before the withdrawal of M. St. Armand from the French Cabinet.—*Ed.*

she has almost none. I shall return to this subject in my fourth Lecture.

There still remains then Prussia. Prussia, we are informed by Lord Palmerston, actually enjoys representative institutions. Any man, who can read a newspaper, may convince himself that there are indeed two Chambers in Prussia—an Upper House and a Lower House. To understand the position of those Chambers, it may, however, be as well not to forget, that by far the greater majority of its members are government officials ; and that indeed in no other state in the world is officialism thus pervading all ranks of society. From his cradle to his grave, there is not one individual—man, woman or child—who in that state is not followed step by step, guided and taken care of, warned and punished, or praised and rewarded, by a host of guardian spirits, called in the language of those people—policemen ! The moment an infant is born it is pounced upon by some tutelary genius, especially appointed for the purpose of pouncing upon infants. The father is cited before him ; he is asked who was *his* father, and who was his mother, and who is *he* ? He is asked the year of his birth, and the date of his birth, and the place of his birth ; and after all these points have been duly ascertained and written down, he is asked what age he is ; as though a man who was born in 1822, might, against the permission of the police, have contrived surreptitiously to be younger than thirty years of age in 1852. Well then, after having satisfied himself on those various points connected with the father's birth, the police-agent inquires into his condition of life, profession or trade ; and this point being settled, he examines him again with regard to his religious principles—whether he belongs to any of those denominations which he, the policeman, in

his wisdom and piety, can conscientiously tolerate and approve of. He then requires him to produce a certificate of his father's birth, of his mother's birth, of his father's marriage, of his mother's marriage, and of his own birth, evidently to remove from his mind a doubt as to whether the person whom he is examining has really been born, or has crept into the world in defiance of the police regulations. After this the child is baptized in observance of the said regulations; after which he is vaccinated; after which he is delivered up into the primary school, and to the secondary school, from which he passes to his apprenticeship, and to the highest school, from which he passes into the army, and from that he passes into the reserve; and at the same time, as the case may be, into a government office or into a trade; if into the latter, he is inscribed in the register of the police as belonging to a certain trade, to a certain police-district, to a certain class of rate-payers, to a certain religious denomination, and to a certain military division. In all these respects he is overlooked by the different officials, who take care he does his duty, and provide him with the respective certificates, all of which, having been increasing since the time of his birth through all the different stages of his education, he has to produce on all occasions. He cannot go from one town to another without having previously received a new certificate from the police of his district, and another certificate from the military authority, stating him to be duly born, duly baptized, duly vaccinated, duly educated, duly disciplined, duly obedient, and duly provided with money; of a proper age, and of a proper height; describing the colour of his eyes, of his brows, his hair and his beard, measuring the length of his nose, the width of his mouth, and the shape of his head; and finally stating that he is

perfectly innocent of any crime, political or otherwise ; and that he is not suspected of undertaking his journey for any purposes dangerous to public order or morality.

You will naturally suspect me of exaggeration, for it appears incredible that such a state of things could exist anywhere. Nevertheless, every single trait of the whole portrait which I have been drawing is from life. There was, only the other day, an account of Mr. DAWSON the lecturer's adventure with the police of Saxony ; and from it you will find that all these foolish questions were put to him. Such questions are perfectly absurd in themselves ; but at the same time they perfectly well answer their purpose—of bringing a man's whole existence in its minutest details under the direction of the police, who, after having conducted him through the school and the army, conduct for him his trade, watch his pleasures, arrange his assemblies, his festivals, dinners, balls, theatres, operas, and concerts. These gentry also make his bills of fare, his dancing order and his programme ; they have their inspectors, commissaries, gendarmes, reporters, and spies, in all places, in all houses, and at all hours, to keep him in order, to maintain discipline in his family, amongst his guests and his servants ; they encourage modesty, check dangerous enthusiasm at public places, force refractory beauties to sing, and make lame dancers hop ; in short, they are everywhere, they do everything, register everthing under its rubric, report it to its proper authority, and run it up to its proper bulk in writing !

There may be in other countries governments more arbitrary and more cruel ; there may be more downright tyranny, more destruction of human life, and more lawless persecution ; but there is no slavery more systematic, more searching, and more galling to the mind,

than that *paternal* rule, which treats all men, during their whole lives, as babies, and never loosens their leading-strings. Now, if we ask how such a system could grow up amongst a people of Teutonic origin, jealous, like all the people of that race whether in England or America, of their individual independence—the answer is, The rule of absolutism has been established in Prussia in consequence of the same European system which has made of France and Austria powers irremediably despotic. The Prussian state is composed of seventy little pieces of land, separately acquired and annexed, bit after bit, to the Brandenburg estate. The purpose for which those pieces were appropriated was to increase the revenues of the Hohen-Zollern family, in order to enable them to keep up the number of troops necessary for maintaining a large army. By means of that army, the Hohen-Zollerns were to be enabled to keep up a respectable position amongst their rapacious neighbours, viz., Sweden, Saxony, Poland, Russia, Austria, and France. The three first of those powers have ceased to be powers. The three latter still threaten Prussia. She is so feeble with respect to them, that she can only maintain the semblance of being a large power by making a camp of the whole state. Every Prussian is a soldier, and is at the same time brought up in the notion that there is only one object worthy of the desire of a noble mind, viz., to distinguish himself as a government official. The possibility of every able man raising himself to a government appointment is inoculated into the youths as the real perfection of liberal institutions. This is the true principle of the celebrated system of Prussian education—the *principle* that man was born to be a *royal functionary*. In so far as a man is successful in this direction, he is

believed to realize his proper destination ; in so far as he is independently living by his own industry—for his own purposes—he remains below the high object which nature has intended him for when she created him—a sort of inferior being, a brute, in short, a *subject*. To escape this horrible doom, the poorest man willingly subjects himself and his family to the severest privations, to make of his son *something* ; and to be *something* is, in the language of Prussia, to obtain a government appointment. Even the common soldier is at least *something* : he wears the king's livery ; he is one of the screws of the machine called Prussia ; whilst the richest man, the most nobly-born, the most profound genius, is only the material to be consumed by the bureaucracy, (of which the poor nobility is the moving spring) for the honour of the Prussian name, and particularly for their own livelihood. The first and best men of the people have no position in society if their existence is not duly legalized by at least some honorary title or some order of knighthood. All the great merchants covet from the government the title of " Commercial Counsellors ;" all the great physicians covet the title of " Sanitary Counsellors ;" the great artists and poets are made " Aulic Counsellors ;" or something grander still, like the poet, Tieck, who was elevated by the present King of Prussia, to the sublime dignity of " *Privy* Aulic Counsellor."

If, after this sketch of Austrian conservatism and Prussian liberalism, we draw the results of the comparison, it is manifest that in spirit they are the same. but that the Prussian is the more perfidious, and therefore the more demoralizing of the two. The Austrian chancellor pursued the plan of carefully removing from the people all sources of intellectual or moral develop-

ment. The scheme of the Prussian bureaucracy, on the contrary, is to force the energies of the people's mind in the hot-bed of a puerile vanity, and to make them the self-devoted fanatics of their rule. The Austrian system is one of artificial babyhood; but, although thwarting the people's character, it does not exhaust its energies. By the Prussian system the state is made a schoolroom, in which the people are publicly examined to show off their prodigious talents and to receive prizes for their exercises from the hands of their masters. Your real government-schooled Prussian always thinks himself a prodigy. He never utters a sentence without beginning it with *I* and concluding it with *myself*, as hopeful boys use to do. The entire state I should compare to a hopeful boy, who, by his admirable exercises in all classical styles, ancient as well as modern, excites the admiration of all who know him, but who nevertheless is only a boy, whose doings are only school exercises. Prussia is a sort of great European power; Berlin is a sort of Rome or Athens; Potsdam is a sort of Versailles; there has been even a sort of revolution after the French pattern in Berlin, and at present there is a sort of Upper House, and a sort of Lower House, holding their sittings at the same capital, after the English fashion, whilst the king has been practising throughout his life his task of imitating all the examples of all the great kings, with which ancient or modern history can furnish him! In my opinion, the state and government, whose spirit is pettiness, deceit, and farce-playing, have been much more injurious to the manliness of character of all the people of Northern Germany than the influence of the Austrian rule upon the people of Southern Germany. If the Austrian method may be termed a political papacy, the Prussian state may be called a political

school of Jesuits ; and what is still worse, neither of these systems are to be ascribed to the invention or malevolent disposition of any particular monarch, minister, or clique ; but they are the necessary and inevitable consequences of the internal construction as well as of the external relations of the two powers in the system of the European equilibrium.

END OF LECTURE II.

LECTURE III.

DIPLOMACY AND WAR.

Working of the System with regard to the *Mutual Intercourse* between the European Nations.—Policy of Austria, England, and France with regard to the Smaller Powers.—Policy of England and Russia against each other.—The Oriental, the Sleswig-Holstein, and the Centro-Asiatic Questions.—Lord Palmerston and Count Nesselrode.

I HAVE shown in my last Lecture the effects of the political systems of Europe upon popular liberty. In this Lecture we will consider its influence upon the relations between the powers. Let us see how the world has been arranged by the sacred treaties of 1815. The centre of Europe is broken up, in consequence of the long struggle between Romanism and Germanism, into about half a hundred chieftainships or family-estates; some assuming the important title of kingdoms, others being modestly satisfied with the less pompous names of Electorates, Grand-duchies, Duchies, Principalities, and so on; each and all of them, however, being acknowledged as independent states, although some of them should only have an army of ten men on foot, of which nine are generally officers. Now, these powerful(!) states are enclosed by Austria, Prussia, and France. What must, therefore, be the consequence? If I knew nothing of European history, I should say, Austria, Prussia, and France, will be coveting the

territories of such mock potentates, enclosed between them ; and their conflicting greediness will maintain an everlasting state of either secret or open hostility between the three great powers. Now, the history of Europe confirms in every particular such an inference. Again, Austria, Prussia, and France, are enclosed between Russia and England. The two latter empires do not exactly stand as high in power above Austria, Prussia, and France, as Austria, Prussia, and France exceed the little German and Italian Principalities ; still they exercise a considerable superiority of strength over them, and they are jealous of the superiority they exercise. They are jealous both of the three inferior states and of each other. That jealousy, again, I contend, arises naturally out of the arrangements of 1815. I do not believe that, as long as the treaties of Vienna are in force, the international relations between the European people will ever be materially improved by the mere power of eloquence. I will endeavour to prove this proposition by reviewing the policy practised or practicable between the European states.

To begin with the feeblest of the so-called great powers of Europe, viz., Prussia. Let us first state the facts of her diplomatic career since 1815. By-and-by we shall draw our conclusions from those facts. There is a document which was published in the year 1835, by one Dr. Kombst, who had been a secretary at the Prussian Embassy at Frankfort. In leaving the Prussian service, he took with him the copies of several diplomatic documents, which he considered himself justified, from motives, I believe, of moral and patriotic indignation, to reveal to the world. The genuineness of those diplomatic revelations has never been either doubted or impugned. The drift of the document in question is, that Prussia ought seemingly to abstain from the desire

of exercising any direct influence upon the smaller German states, which seeming abstinence would enable her to exert her influence so much more effectually by indirect means. Those indirect means are detailed in the following suggestions. At Dresden, the capital of the neighbouring little kingdom of Saxony, a party was to be formed to agitate for the annexation of that Principality to Prussia. This scheme may serve you as a further illustration of the regard which is paid by the sovereigns themselves to the pretended principle of legitimacy. Legitimacy is a good doctrine for awing the people. As to the princes, none of them would hesitate, or ever did hesitate, to extinguish the legitimacy of never so many of his colleagues for the sake of his own aggrandisement. Further, Prussia, it is said in the memorandum, must always excite the minor German states to quarrel with each other. This would give them the salutary habit of submitting their differences to the supreme arbitration of Austria and Prussia, and by this means again an opportunity would be offered to the latter power for showing off a high rectitude and impartiality, by seizing now and then upon the occasion of opposing ostentatiously an unpopular judgment or proposition of Austria. Moreover, Prussia must always represent herself as the truly German power in opposition to Austria, being composed of so many different races, and by recalling the glories of the war of independence against Napoleon. Finally, Prussia must represent herself as the truly liberal and enlightened power. This latter task, you conceive, was less difficult in opposition to Austria, than in comparison with France. In the latter country, representative institutions had been established since 1815. But then France was a Catholic power. So Prussia was to come out powerfully as the

head of Protestantism, and, although opposed to popular forms of Government, was still to be acknowledged as fostering a government of the most liberal principles, as encouraging throughout true intelligence and enlightenment, and as professing the most energetic, firm, and wise administration, and as opening to every talent the career most adapted to its energies. In the race of this species of public deception, there was one state that threatened to outdo Prussia in the public opinion of Germany, viz., the small kingdom of Wurtemberg. Wurtemberg was as much Protestant as Prussia, and in addition to that recommendation had put on the garb of representative institutions, as a superior bait for German sympathies. This was a cause of serious alarm to Prussia, whose enlightenment and liberalism consisted merely in educating the half of her people to become government officials. To remove such dangerous rivalry, the memorandum recommends the plan of secretly stimulating Austria to threaten Wurtemberg back into absolutism. You see how dear the cause of liberalism and of enlightenment actually was to Prussia! Now, the avowed purpose of all these infamous intrigues is expressly stated, viz., the double object of (firstly) joining with Austria for the purpose of excluding the three other great powers from all influence at the smaller German courts; and (secondly) of throwing odium upon Austria, so as to prepare for the day of rupture, when it was expected that all the smaller states, and all the people of Germany, would side with the truly German, the truly enlightened, the truly liberal, and the truly Protestant power, against the un-national, despotic, and bigoted House of Hapsburgh! Such was the policy of Prussia from 1815 to 1848, as exposed in her own secret confessions. To dispossess the King of Saxony of his kingdom; to excite the

smaller states to quarrel with each other; to play the part of protector of their rights against Austria; to force Wurtemberg, by the instrumentality of Prince Metternich, to abandon her representative institutions; (all this, mark, whilst deceiving the people of Germany and of Europe by a system of bureaucratic education, which was deemed liberal, because it allured the poor as well as the rich into the government service;)—to pretend friendship to Austria, whilst preparing for the day of a war against her—this is the famous system of Prussian liberalism and enlightenment.

The example of this state is particularly instructive to those who know what chances there are for real progress and enlightenment, for liberty and peace, on the basis of the present arrangement of Europe. It proves that the most dangerous enemies to liberty and peace are not the open despots, such as the three emperors, nor the open schemers of warlike expeditions, such as Prince Joinville and M. Billot. These are not the men whom the friends of peace and liberty ought to consider as their most dangerous enemies. Despotism and war attack civilization openly. Civilization is always occupied to parry their blows or to heal them. But he was a wise man who prayed, "Preserve me from my friends, from my enemies I shall preserve myself." Such states as Prussia and Sardinia, which are ever ready to put on any amount of liberal appearances; and such governments as those of Louis Philippe and of Louis Napoleon, which are ever ready with their professions of peace in order to serve the ends of a treacherous and barbarous diplomacy—such states and such individuals are the false friends of civilization, disarming her suspicions, and making her the willing instrument of human degradation! The important point to be kept in view is, that the treach-

erous policy of the pseudo-liberal states is not a matter of free choice with them. The plan of action which is exposed in the Prussian memorandum, and which was followed out by the Prussian government with perfect consistency from 1815 to 1848, and from 1848 to 1853, is imposed upon her by the *necessities* of her position, and will ever remain imposed upon her as long as the arrangements of 1815 remain in force. I said, in my last Lecture, that an honest man would not lend himself to do the work of a prime minister of Austria; but that the prime minister of Austria was in that capacity obliged to act as Metternich and Haynau acted, exactly as a professional hangman is not reprehensible for doing the duties of his profession, but for choosing a profession which imposes upon him duties of such a character. In the same manner I venture to affirm, that the existence of such a state as Prussia is incompatible with either peace or liberty, but nevertheless, those who admit the *existence* of that state, have no right to blame the profound perfidy of its policy. Reflect on its situation.

The Emperor Alexander of Russia demanded in 1815 the duchy of Warsaw for himself. That duchy had originally formed the Prussian part of the Polish spoil. But as Russia had occupied it immediately upon Napoleon's retreat, her arguments for retaining it appeared conclusive. Prussia then demanded in exchange the kingdom of Saxony; but as she had neither occupied it nor had the power of taking it, her arguments appeared very poor indeed. She was obliged to accept the Rhenish provinces as an equivalent. Now, those provinces are separated from the bulk of her territory by several small German sovereignties; they are bordering on France, and their population is of the Catholic religion, whilst the other Prussians are

Protestants. Consider, moreover, that Prussia is by far the smallest and the poorest of the five great European powers. She does not possess half the number of either the Austrian or the French population; the soil of some of her provinces is mere sand; her facilities for commerce are very limited; her military position is really distressing; and in the East, Russia is the immediate neighbour of her open frontier. I shall speak of the plans and national ambitions of the latter power by-and-by. For the present it is sufficient to observe, that any day he chooses, the Czar may march into the Eastern provinces of Prussia, and cut them off. One successful battle, or a skilful march, may give him possession of Berlin, which was the avowed reason for which Lord Castlereagh opposed with all his might the occupation of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw by Russia. But another point, though quite as important, escaped his attention. The only maritime outlet which Prussia possesses is the Baltic. Now, the ports of that sea Russia is at liberty to blockade at a moment's notice, there being no Prussian navy to oppose her. You see, then, that the Eastern division of Prussia is utterly at the mercy of her great neighbour; and her great neighbour is playing a cruel game with her. He, forsooth, professes the most disinterested friendship; he maintains her integrity against Austria, against France, and against liberal or revolutionary attempts—you easily conceive from what motives. If Prussia were destroyed, the Czar would have to fight with Austria and France for the spoil of the territory. But in her present state, being much too weak to stand alone, she must lean upon somebody, and that somebody can neither be Austria, her arch-enemy; nor France, who covets her Rhenish provinces; nor England, who is too far off, and known to be very

cautious in interfering actively in Continental affairs. It can only be Russia, generous Russia, who, although he has the power of overrunning in a few days half the Prussian monarchy, acts as her sincere and constant friend against the three other powers. Prussia is then a tool in the hands of the Czar. Her king is his prefect, and her army forms perhaps the most valuable division of his military power. To keep her in such a position, her friend of course takes care to paralyze her attempts to raise herself to a more independent one.

The prosperity of Prussia depends mainly upon two things, viz., 1.—Her trade with Poland. 2.—Her command of the Baltic and of the North Sea, including the free communication between those two waters. Accordingly, her ally systematically shuts up Poland, ruining thereby the once flourishing commerce of the Baltic ports and the Silesian linen trade. And with regard to the second point—and at the same time as a military precaution—he maintains what is called the integrity of the Danish monarchy, but which in reality means the blockade of the Prussian ports. For Denmark is as little able to stand alone against Prussia as Prussia is to stand against the other powers. Denmark has, therefore, thrown herself into the arms of Russia; and the Danish fleet serves under the Russian admiralty against Prussia, exactly as the Prussian army serves under Field-marshal Paskiewitch against Austria and France. This is the proper meaning of the Sleswig-Holstein question. Lord Palmerston lent himself in that affair to the views of Russia. You observe, that between the Russian restrictions of trade, and the very heavy toll which Denmark demands from all vessels passing the Sound, it is impossible for the Baltic towns ever to rise to anything like that commercial greatness

to which their extraordinary energy entitles them. All along the Baltic there are sea-ports like Memel, Königsberg, Dantzic, Stettin, Stralsund, Greifswald, Kiel, and others, which, if the Polish and Russian plains behind them were not closed by a line of military posts, and if the narrow strait of the Sound before them were not guarded by a heavy Danish toll, would long since have risen to the importance of places like Liverpool or New York. They might have cut a canal through Sleswig: but Lord Palmerston has combined with Russia and France to withdraw that German province from the control of the Germans, by riveting it, against the loud protestations of its people, to the Danish monarchy. The case of the Sleswig-Holstein people is exactly similar to that of Hungary. I have not time to enter upon that subject here. Thus much, however, is evident, viz., that the whole North of Germany is smothered under the weight of the European system, which all the powers combine with Russia to maintain. If Russia had not to deal with a petty dismembered principality like Prussia, but with a compact national body of Germans, reaching from the Baltic to the Rhine, there would be a speedy end to that diplomacy which forces the people of central Europe to waste their strength with playing at soldiers, and in writing bad poetry for want of something better to do. I say, then, that the question of nationality is an eminently practical question; that the dreamers in this case are not those who would establish the international relations of Europe upon the safe basis of powerful national distinctions; but that the dreamers and quacks are those who have for all political and social diseases only one remedy to prescribe, viz., representative institutions. I am a sincere admirer of the institutions of this country; but I am a still greater admirer of the

character of this people ; and I believe that character derives the best part of its energy from its national feeling and national concentration. *It is not your institutions that gave you independence ; but it is your independence that gave you your institutions.* Those institutions, therefore, are not like Morrison's Pills, to be bought ready made up in boxes, and to be swallowed by the King of Prussia, or the Emperor Napoleon, or the Czar of Russia, in order to cure them of despotism without loss of time, or interruption of business. Despotism does not reside in the individual ; it resides in standing armies and lying diplomatists. Nor will standing armies ever give way to persuasion as long as states are so constructed that nothing can keep them standing but standing armies. The condition of Prussia would not be rightly expressed by saying that Prussia *keeps* a standing army. It would be more in accordance with the real character of that establishment to say, Prussia *is* a standing army. The whole state is properly speaking a camp. If she were to give over training her whole population in soldiership, she would be at the mercy of surrounding enemies, since in the East she is expected to protect German interests and independence against Russia ; and is their only guardian in the West against France, Belgium, and Holland. Again, in the North she is smothered by Denmark's allies, and is threatened by Austria in the South.

We hear at the present moment much of the peaceful disposition of France. So far as England is concerned, I believe in the present professions of the *Moniteur* ; for one good reason, viz., because England is now protected against a surprise ; but you will find that the very assurances of peace to England are accompanied in the French papers by side glances cast

at the treaties of Vienna. France considers that she has been injured by those treaties. She believes she has a right to the whole left bank of the Rhine, and that she has been robbed by Prussia. How did France ever happen to hit upon the strange idea of considering a broad navigable river, streaming from its beginning to its end through the midst of German people, as the natural frontier of the French empire? Simply because Germany is unprotected, having fallen to pieces through religious wars and princely ambitions. Even Belgium and Holland, small though they be, are strong enough—enjoying as they do the countenance of France and Great Britain—successfully to refuse to Prussia the free passage to *their* part of the German sea coast. Thus the German people are blockaded on every side, because the only power which has an interest to break through that blockade, viz., Prussia, is not strong enough to do so! Thus Prussia herself is blockaded, threatened, and worried on all sides, because—the reason is obvious—because, she has been arrested in her career of aggrandisement by the treaties of 1815. She is the very fragment of a great power; the jealousy of her three colleagues at the congress determined that she should never be anything else. They gave her the distant and Catholic Rhenish provinces, ever coveted by France, in exchange for the Grand-duchy of Warsaw. Thus they made France her rival, Russia her guardian, and Belgium, Holland, and Denmark, her keepers. But this was not all: she is broken up in the middle. Austria needs only to march into the intervening Electorate of Hesse to cut off the Eastern portions of Prussia from the Western, and to blow down the whole card-castle of the Prussian monarchy by the first sound of the war-trumpet. You ask why should Austria do such a thing? If Austria had no

other special reasons for doing such a thing, I should simply answer by another question—Why should America covet Cuba and Mexico? Why should England have conquered the Indian empire? Simply because it is in the nature of every power, whatever be its name, to increase to the limits of its capabilities of increasing. If England at present stop short in her career of aggrandisement, it is chiefly for the same reason for which once upon a time the Emperor Augustus laid down the principle of not extending the limits of the Roman empire any further, i. e., because the great extension of the English possessions is becoming exceedingly troublesome to England herself. By this observation I do not mean to impugn the sincerity of England's non-aggressive principle; but I believe that those principles by themselves would never be strong enough to keep her from conquering the whole Chinese empire, or any other country, great or small, if the safety or even the supremacy of England had any benefit to derive from such a scheme.

If we, therefore, would establish a reign of international peace, we should not trust to the mere force of persuasion, but endeavour so to arrange as to make peace in respect to those who are called upon to keep it, not to become a continual sacrifice of their dearest, moral, national, or, may be, merely selfish interests. Why should Austria march into the Electorate of Hesse, thus severing the two parts of Prussia from each other, and threatening her with destruction? Austria actually did march into the Electorate of Hesse for such a purpose hardly three years ago. So we need not speculate about the possibility of Austria conceiving such a plan at all. She did conceive such a plan, because Prussia had posted her armies, under the pretext of putting down the revolution, in every part of Germany,

occupying Saxony, Holstein, the Grand-duchy of Baden and Frankfort, and meaning never to leave hold again of any of those principalities. Austria was then perfectly justified in marching into Hesse, for the sake of her future safety. Nay, supposing that a family establishment of the description of Austria has any right at all to exist, she has a right any day she thinks it safe to take from Prussia the province of Silesia, of which Maria Theresa was robbed some hundred years ago, by Frederick the Great. Lastly, Prussia, as we have seen from her own confessions, is continually engaged in operations of aggressive though secret hostility against Austria. Why then should Austria not openly endeavour to destroy her enemy?

There are men who would propose to settle these differences between the two powers, by the King of Prussia writing an amicable note to the Emperor of Austria, inviting him to give his concurrence to a plan of both powers reducing, by mutual consent, their standing armies to half their present number. It may readily be supposed that there *might* be two monarchs at the heads of these two states so ignorant of their own positions, and at the same time so good-tempered, as to subscribe in the sincerity of their hearts a compact of eternal peace upon such conditions. But would such an arrangement alter anything in the position of Prussia? Would she cease to be at the mercy of Russia and of France? Would the Russian people become at once so civilized by a similar note being written to their Czar, as to give up the plan of domineering over Germany by means of Prussia, or of obstructing the progress of Prussia and Germany by means of Denmark? Will a third note, written to the Emperor of France in a similar spirit, cure the French people of their fixed idea of having a right to the

dominion over a part of the German people on the Rhine? In short, if Prussia did exact from the present rulers of the great European states a written promise neither openly to attack her, nor to impede the development of her natural resources, would she be wise to place her future safety in the hands of three such men? Have there never been such things as revolutions in Russia, revolutions in Austria, and revolutions in France? Have there never been, independent of all revolutions, changes of policy in the Austrian, the French, and the Russian Cabinets? Have there never been treaties between Prussia and those three powers, to the effect of establishing between each and all of them eternal peace and everlasting friendship? Why! the history of Europe is made up of an uninterrupted series of such treaties, sworn to-day to be eternally binding, and broken to-morrow, to be re-sworn and to be re-broken again. What are those very treaties of Vienna, but a peaceable arrangement between all the European governments, in accordance with exactly the same scheme which at present is proposed as a novelty. What was the Holy Alliance, but a mutual agreement between the governments of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to make an end of war for ever, and to arrange their differences after the principles of Christianity? What were the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Verona, Carlsbad, and others, but courts of international arbitration? What was the policy of Prince Metternich and of Louis Philippe but a policy of peace? What efforts could be greater than those made by the said governments to preserve peace, and what greater power could be wielded than they employed to give effect to their sincere endeavours? Why, then, is the necessity still felt of seeking for other guarantees for the preserva-

tion of peace than the solemn treaties, the mutual promises, and the sincere endeavours of all these governments are found to be able to afford? Is it because they continue to keep standing armies? But would they keep standing armies if they believed in the efficacy of their own sworn promises and international arbitration courts? Why do they not believe in the efficacy of those institutions? I will tell you why. Because they all know that the *ultimate* causes of either revolution or war have *not* been removed by their agreements. On the contrary, the causes of revolution and war are, as it were, frozen fast in their treaties. Nothing short of the ice of despotism can keep war and revolution bound for a time; and, therefore, the mutilated members of races are by their treaties bound together by *armed force*. Hence the destruction of those states is the only possible remedy for national emancipation. By their treaties a number of small states have been placed between three great powers. Hence the temptation of aggrandisement, irresistible to any but angels of prime-ministers and foreign secretaries: hence the multiplied opportunities for intrigue; hence the unavoidable rekindling of jealousies; hence the policy of all the powers preparative of war.

Again, by the treaties, Prussia has been placed at the mercy of one barbarous power and another state inhabited by the most excitable and ambitious of nations. Hence, Prussia is obliged, in self-defence against France and Russia, to strive after an extension and completion of her fragmentary territory. Hence, Austria, on the other hand, is obliged, in self-defence against Prussia, to countermine the mines of that power. Lastly, by the treaties they have cut off the German people from all its sea-coasts; they have

countenanced, encouraged, and assisted the little states of Denmark, of Holland, and of Belgium, to insult the German nation, and impede her commercial progress; they have blockaded her in the East, in the West, in the North, and in the South; they have thus stifled the energies and progress of the liberty of the most laborious, industrious, and intellectual of nations, who were themselves the primeval inventors of the representative institutions; they have made that nation a military outpost of Russia, of a people of Asiatic barbarians; and can you believe that the German nation ever would subscribe to a peace which is meant to eternalize those very relations between the states of Europe, by which she herself is made the general target of insolence and contempt for all the nations, whether barbarous or civilized, whether great or small? If ever she does, she will fully deserve to rot under the weight of native despotism, foreign diplomacy, and self-contempt. I sincerely trust she never will.

Nor will Italy. Italy will never lend her hand to any scheme by which the existence and safety of her present states should be doubly confirmed and consolidated, for the existence of her present states is the dominion of the stranger over Italy; as the existence of the present German states is, although less directly, the dominion of the stranger over Germany. The affairs of Italy are better known in this country than those of Germany. The case is more simple, because the presence of foreign oppression is more obvious. But the principle is the same. The dismembered state of the Italian nation is holding out an eternal temptation to the great powers, either to conquer her or to make her fight *their* battles. In the case of France and Austria the effects of such a system are obvious. France holds Rome against Austria; Austria

holds Lombardy against France. If France had not taken Rome, Austria would have taken it. Those two powers have been fighting for the possession of Italy and of Germany for hundreds of years: i. e., ever since the famous expedition of Charlemagne. But it is less well known that Russia and England are fighting on the same territory, not for conquest but for influence. England has established her head quarters in Sardinia; Russia in Naples. You ask, Why does not England leave Italy alone? I answer, because it is the well-known plan of France to make the Mediterranean a French lake, and the well-known plan of Russia to make the Mediterranean a Russian lake, whilst England is in actual possession of those waters, and is not willing to cede their possession to either France or Russia, to either Austria or to Italy herself. Now, France endeavours at present to maintain a footing in Italy by putting herself forth as the protector of the Catholic religion, Russia as the supporter of the absolute courts, and England by favouring representative institutions in the separate little states, such as Sardinia. Which of those parties really befriends the Italian people? None. They will make the Italian parties fight for the interests of foreigners; the priests for France, the despots for Russia, the constitutionalists for England.

Italy has no friends but those Italians who use every effort to make an end of the shameful game, by uniting the whole peninsula into one national body, strong enough to be their own masters. Here, again, Englishmen are apt to be misled by an appeal to their sense of moderation. The whole combat is represented as one between anarchy and despotism, between which the representative institutions of England are most opportunely offering themselves as a happy medium.

The fact is, that the question of Italy is, like that of Germany, one of national independence. Such national independence is impossible where a number of little courts are worked upon from without to push the interests of foreigners, and therefore those courts must be abolished, before any kind of real security for any kind of independence or liberty can be obtained. The republicanism of the Germans and Italians has, therefore, nothing whatever to do with questions of abstract political metaphysics. The abolition of these dynasties is a purely practical requisite for a thoroughly practical end, and it is far from excluding common sense and moderation. But if common sense and moderation will continue to produce themselves as the champions of national abjectness, I am afraid the people of the Continent will acquire the habit of identifying in their minds national freedom with political extravagance.

I maintained in my First Lecture, that by virtue of the present political system, the people of central Europe had not only to defray the expenses of their own courts and armies of soldiers and policemen, but have also to fight the diplomatic battles of the five great powers, and that they have to fight those battles, not only at the expense of their properties, but of their moral health, their happiness, their liberty, and their national independence. I believe I have, by the foregoing sketches, established the proof of that assertion. It remains to be shown, that not only the people of the smaller European powers, but also the peoples and governments of France and Austria are wasted in nearly the same way as material for diplomatic consumption, and were implements of war in the contest between Russia and England.

England occupies a line of military stations on the whole circumference of the same circle of which the

Russian empire forms the centre. Beginning from this island, there is Heligoland to watch the Sound; and there are Gibraltar, Malta, and the Ionian Islands to awe the governments of the Mediterranean into amity, and to keep watch at the gates of the Dardanelles. There is the isthmus of Suez, which is about being colonized as it were by an English railway—a colony to which the protection of English arms will never be wanting. Then there is the fortress of Aden, which commands the outlet of the Arabian Gulf, and the island of Karak, which was occupied in 1838 to ensure the obedience of Persia—all of them forming the links of a long chain, which unites the East Indian empire with the United Kingdom; and from which, again, another chain of military and naval stations extends to the North of the Celestial empire. On all those points England must keep watch, but particularly on the three mentioned above. For the possession of the Sound would complete the subjection of all the countries around the Baltic, more especially Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden, under the sway of Russia. The occupation of the Dardanelles would give her the command over the Austrian empire, the Mediterranean, Asia Minor, and Egypt. The possession of the Plateau of Central Asia enables its proprietor to send forth the floods of those nomadic tribes, from whom all the conquerors of Asia arose, either against the Anglo-Indian empire, or against China. Thus the present political history of the old world, as far as its regular course is not interrupted by revolutions, is bound up with the question of Sleswig-Holstein, in which that of the Sound is involved, as well as are the Oriental and Persian questions. In each of those questions, either of the two contending parties is always ready to avail itself of some difficulty arising in the internal affairs of Denmark, the Ottoman

empire, or Persia, in order to beat its antagonist out of the country. It is therefore a great mistake to believe that the Sleswig-Holstein question, the Oriental question, or the question of Herat, is really settled. These questions can never be settled, and must always break out again on some new pretext, as long as the struggle between England and Russia is continued in this manner. It is a still greater mistake to believe a single word of the declamations of the press regarding the different political parties in those countries. If they tell you that the vassal of Herat is right in revolting against the emperor of Persia—if they take the part of Abbas Pacha against the Sultan, or if they declare that the government of Denmark is perfectly justified in trampling under foot the constitution of Sleswig-Holstein—they may be or may not be right; but certain it is, that their siding with either the one or the other of the political parties of those countries, has nothing whatever to do with right or wrong, but is altogether the result of a diplomatic inspiration, which, in many cases, makes them unconsciously adopt as a matter of course that view of the question which is favourable to the diplomatic interests of England as opposed to those of Russia.

After having stated the point of view from which alone those three questions can be understood, namely, as questions between Russia and England, I confine myself to the task of giving you a few authenticated circumstances connected with the history of one of those questions, in order to leave no doubt in your minds on the fact of such a contest between Russian and English diplomacy really being carried on, and having been carried on for many years; and for this purpose I choose the Centro-Asiatic question as the one in which both the objects and the means of the

two contending parties are exhibited with particular clearness. There lies on the borders of Persia and Afghanistan the town of Herat, which, by its situation in a fruitful oasis, and by its strategical position, has always been considered to be the military key to Afghanistan, as Afghanistan has been always considered, by all the inland conquerors of India, to be the military key of the latter country. Now, this town and oasis of Herat had, since the end of the last century, been in a kind of feudal dependency upon the Persian empire ; but in 1837, at the death of the Persian emperor, the chief of Herat, like almost all the other chiefs of that part of Persia, rose in insurrection against Mohammed Mirza, the legitimate successor to the Persian throne. Now, it was certainly remarkable, that although Herat was lying at an immense distance from both the Russian and Anglo-Indian frontier, those two powers should have made the most energetic efforts, and almost gone to war with each other, in taking up, the one the cause of an Asiatic despot, and the other that of his rebellious vassal. It would certainly be absurd to suppose that either Count Nesselrode or Lord Palmerston was actuated by a youthful enthusiasm for the right of the one or the other of the two chiefs. It is therefore obvious that, in making those rights the object of a most serious dispute between themselves, each party was actuated by the desire of establishing his own power in Herat, as a military position of the highest importance in the secret war which he knew was carried on against him by the other. Mohammed Mirza, then, the Persian Shah, who was indebted to Russian influence for his throne, concerted, in 1837, with Count Simonitsch, the Russian ambassador at the court of Teheran, the plan of not only conquering Herat, but of marching, after the conquest, with his army towards

Balkh, and from thence along the river Oxus against China, where a Russian army from Orenburgh, under the command of General Perowski, was to join him in the beginning of the spring of 1838. Where was this Russian army to proceed? Obviously to Herat, the key of Affghanistan. For what purpose? The idea of Russia conquering the Anglo-Indian empire has been justly ridiculed. Russia thinks as little of undertaking such an expedition as of marching directly upon Berlin, or Vienna, or Rome. Russia never pursues an object straightforwardly as long as she can attain it by indirect means. But at the same time that the expedition from Orenburgh was preparing, a Russian captain, of the name of Vickowitch, was sent with a letter from the Shah to the Affghan chiefs, calling upon them to raise again the banner of Islamism on the borders of the Indus, so that the occupation of *Herat* would obviously have served two purposes, viz., firstly, of fomenting from thence war and insurrection against the English government of India, both on the borders and in the interior; and secondly, of working upon the warlike tribes of Central Asia, to make them instrumental in Russian projects either against India or China, as might best suit the occasion. The English ambassador at the Persian court, therefore, hastened from Teheran to Herat, to offer his friendly mediation between the Shah and his beleaguered vassal. As far as those two parties were concerned, he would have easily succeeded in reconciling them; but the counsels of Count Simonitsch, who was also present in the Shah's camp, prevailed; and so disinterestedly did the Russian ambassador act in the sacred cause of legitimacy, that he not only paid the arrears of the Persian troops, but also ordered an officer of his staff to super-

intend the erection of batteries and other military operations against the town.

It is from this time (June, 1838), after the ultimatum of Mr. McNeil, the English ambassador, had been rejected by Persia, that the English government became particularly awake to the necessity of opening a nearer route to India than that by the Cape, and that it became the special object of its care to gain a firm footing as well at the outlets of the Arabian and Persian Gulfs as in China and Afghanistan. The Persian island of Karak was taken by an English squadron, on the 19th of June, 1838, without any previous declaration of war; and at the same time Mr. McNeil informed the chief justice, the clergy, and some of the grandees of Persia, that the British government was the friend of *the people* of Persia, and those hostile measures were only taken against the *Persian government*. I mention this fact because it will contribute to make you acquainted with the real character of the system of the balance of power which in Europe is constantly covered by all the kinds of specious pretexts of law and right, but which, in those remote countries, where there is no public opinion to be complimented, shows itself in its undisguised nakedness, i. e., as a war between England and Russia, in which the intervening countries, peoples, and governments, are considered in no other light than as implements of war, and are used as such. Count Simonitsch, in order to conquer Herat for Russia, profited by the title of right which the Shah certainly had, as by doing so he manifestly made war upon England. England was obliged, in order to parry the blow, to support the cause of the rebellious vassal, and to conquer a position from which she might threaten Persia, so as not to allow her to become altogether an instrument in the hands of

Russia. The war between the two great antagonists, which is carried on by means of the European governments and peoples, is, in its essence, of exactly the same character, only that greater pains are taken to preserve a show of decency and justice. The basis of the system by which the relations between those states have been settled being wrong, it is impossible upon that basis to act aright, if you will not deliver yourselves up to the unscrupulousness of your enemy.

So far the unscrupulous measures of the English government had the desired effect. Utterly incapable of opposing the least resistance to an English invasion, the Shah was obliged to retreat from Herat, and to submit to all the conditions imposed upon him by Lord Palmerston, in spite of the humblest representations and prayers of the Persian ambassador. Since that time the Russian and English governments exercised in common their protectorate over this unhappy country, and appointed in 1848, the successor of Mohammed Mirza by an amicable agreement between themselves, as in 1852 they appointed that of the King of Denmark in Sleswig-Holstein. But those amicable agreements, however, are only to be considered as armistices, and the quarrel about Herat is actually on the point of breaking out again: Russia having, since 1850, repeatedly offered to the Shah the assistance of an army for the subjugation of that rebellious chieftainship, whilst English papers have been taking the greatest pains to prove to the world that the chief of Herat is perfectly right in rising against the emperor.

Before, however, the affair of Herat had thus been settled, Russia had sent Captain Vickowitch, as I mentioned above, and other agents to conspire with Dost Mohammed and other chiefs against the Anglo-Indian government. At that time the North of

Affghanistan prospered under the rule of that prince. The bazaar of Cabul, his residence, was one of the richest in Asia, the merchants enjoyed perfect security on their road, and a mere financial duty of two and a half per cent. on all imports, procured to the country the blessings of free trade. As a zealous Mussulman, he desired to wrest from the Sikhs the countries on the western bank of the river Indus, and especially to deliver Peshawar from the yoke of the infidels, which would, of course, have contributed considerably to the glory and authority of his name amongst all the neighbouring Mahometan chiefs. But he saw too well that he could not execute such a project, without having the good will of the Anglo-Indian government for it, which, however, rejected all his propositions on that subject, having no reason to be dissatisfied with the devotion of the chief of Peshawar, and being rather jealous of the extension of Dost Mohammed's power. The latter, therefore, like all those of the neighbouring princes who were dissatisfied with the Anglo-Indian government, turned his eyes to St. Petersburg.

Thus it happened that Alexander Burnes and Captain Vickowitch, the English and the Russian agents, met at the same time at Cabul, where they dined together on Christmas day, 1837. The former had come to force upon the prince by threats a commercial treaty, without making the least concession to his wishes; the latter to offer him the assistance of Russian troops after the impending conquest of Herat, or, at all events, Russian subsidies, if that enterprise should prove unsuccessful, and to soothe his apprehensions and flatter his prejudices, of whatever kind they might be. At the same time, Dost Mohammed's ambassador at the Persian court wrote him that the Russians were determined to march to India and attack the English. And

this was, indeed, the language of the Russian agents, who were at that time very active in all the border countries of India. It seems that both Lord Auckland, the governor-general, and Alexander Burnes, allowed themselves to be deceived by this news, which, in my opinion, was spread designedly, in order to encourage the Affghan chief in his warlike projects against the Sikhs, to create a powerful agitation in the North of India, and thus to prevent the Indian government opposing the progress of Russia in China and towards Herat; for which purpose the Sirdars of Candahar actually received ten thousand ducats from the Russian agent, who promised them another ten thousand if they would march against Herat, and was known to have set apart forty thousand for Dost Mohammed.

It was then determined by the Indian government, after mature consideration, and at a time when the Persian Shah had not yet retreated, to put an end to these dangerous intrigues by an armed expedition against Affghanistan and Herat. Thus, whilst an English expedition was setting out for the South, a Russian one was preparing to march from Orenburgh, both to meet in the centre of Asia. From this moment the mutual position of the two great powers was declared, and to prove that Lord Palmerston was thenceforth as perfectly aware of it as Count Nesselrode, we have only to examine the explanations which both the governments considered it necessary to interchange before proceeding to extremities. Lord Palmerston complained of the Russian agents encouraging and supporting the Shah of Persia in warlike expeditions against Affghanistan, on the pretext of antiquated claims. Moreover, it was true that, on a former occasion, the English ambassador at St. Petersburg had been offered the perusal of the originals of

the instructions given to the Russian ambassador in Teheran, in order to convince himself how much the conduct of the latter was a contradiction to his powers; but, nevertheless, that conduct had ever remained the same. The government of Great Britain had received credible information, he affirmed, of the Czar's ambassador having declared to the Shah, that a Russian army was on its march against China and Bokhara. The British government willingly admitted that Russia was at liberty to follow with regard to Persia, as in every other respect, that plan of policy which she might think most conformable to her own interests. Great Britain was too conscious of its own power, and had too sure a knowledge of the sufficiency of its means to defend its interests in every part of the world, to consider the transaction referred to with any serious apprehension; but the British government thought itself entitled to ask the cabinet of St. Petersburg whether the assertions of the Russian government, or the actions of the Russian ambassador, were to form the rule which was to give the direction for the future intercourse between the two powers.


The Russian government, on its side, considered it necessary without waiting for this formal call, freely to explain its views and objects with regard to the Asiatic affairs. The emperor, it was affirmed in this remarkable document, was far from any thought of conquest. Never had the idea entered his mind, nay, it never could, to endanger the security and tranquillity of the British possessions in India. An expedition of that kind was not only unjust but impossible, as a look on the map was sufficient to prove. Although the Shah was perfectly in the right to make war upon Herat, Russia had done all in her power to dissuade him from it. If Count Simonitsch had lent his assistance to the

points which insures to its occupant the dominion over Europe and Asia, has been actually gained by Russia. As to the second point, namely, that of the Sound, I have already alluded to the real meaning of the Sleswig-Holstein question. Respecting the Oriental question, in which that of Constantinople, Egypt, Greece, the Danubian provinces, and Hungary, is concerned, and indirectly the fate of Italy, of the Austrian monarchy, of Germany, and of Poland,—that will be dwelt upon in my next Lecture, in which I shall draw the results of our previous inquiries.

I think that as far as we have advanced in our argument we may, with respect to the present political system of Europe, safely establish the following conclusion, namely, that the treaties by which that system is established were concluded by parties who had no right to make any treaties by which to divide the people of Europe amongst themselves; that by those treaties an order of things is established which is contrary to all human notions of right and reason; that such order is pregnant with woe, and never admits of any better state than that of an armed peace, that armed peace is the very basis of despotism; that, consequently, no manner of freedom can thrive on the basis of the European equilibrium; and that, finally, the prosperity and the moral and intellectual energies of the German and Italian peoples are obstructed (as far as we have seen) and thwarted in a thousand ways by that order of things which makes Russia the master of them all, and France the master of the south of a country which contains a nation originally one of the most industrious, most steady, most upright, most intellectual; individually, the most independent; morally, the most pure; and socially, the most humane on the face of the earth. Nobody ever denied those

qualities to the central nation of Europe: and, nevertheless, although those qualities may be observed at the bottom of their moral constitution, that people are overgrown by a luxuriant crop of sluggishness, fickleness, falsehood, stupidity, servility, sensual indulgence, and brutality; because a people who have no national character to maintain acquire a habit of casting away all that is good in them, and of apeing what is not natural to them, and lose all confidence in themselves. If the maintenance of the treaties of 1815 is the great object of human society, let them be maintained; but if the material prosperity, the moral health, and the intellectual energy of men, are the object, then I say it is necessary to remove that fabric of injustice, of nonsense, of falsehood, of slavery, and of war on earth, and ill will to all men, and that the sooner the better, and by all means!

END OF LECTURE III.



LECTURE IV.

THE REMEDY.

The Spirit and the Necessities of the Age, compared with those of the Political System by which it is governed.—Present Complications and future Prospects.—The Continent, England, America.

THERE is no greater impediment in the way of truth and progress, than that of the proneness of people to forget the object they wish to attain, while quarrelling about the means to their end. Now, *constitutional liberty* had become the rallying cry of the European liberals since 1815; as though it was the *object* of society to realize a King and two Chambers, and not to realize individual liberty, national health and vigour, social harmony, love, and beauty! These are the things we want. We want neither King nor President: they are instruments for social purposes; and I hold it to be highly dangerous to put instruments forth as the true divinities, to whom it is sacrilege not to sacrifice. My creed is not a President, not a King, not one Chamber, not two Chambers, not a Republic, not a Constitutional Monarchy, not a Democracy, not an Aristocracy, not Competition, not Socialism:—my creed is—*Healthy social action as the basis, and truth and beauty as the object of society.*

The people of Continental Europe want, above all things, free scope for their energies. They are bound

hand and foot doubly and trebly ; they are not only bound by their own governments, but their own governments are again held in the chains of other governments. One of the people of the smaller states may succeed, exceptionally, in maintaining a kind of freedom in the face of its own government ; but never without becoming the stake of a secret or open game between the larger powers, and falling, finally, the victim either of their wars or their treaties. As to the larger powers themselves, any kind of freedom is incompatible with their organization. The military and bureaucratic bodies of second and third-rate powers are generally looked down upon with such a profound contempt by the armies and officials of the larger states, and can so little escape the conviction of their own inefficiency, that they rarely offer any vigorous resistance to the people of the smaller states. But the functionary bodies of large states are inspired with all the pride and energy which are inseparable from the feeling of belonging to a powerful corporation ; and the Chambers of such states, wherever there are any Chambers admitted, are therefore placed side by side with a power which none of their resolutions can change into anything but an instrument of absolutism. Those Chambers can, therefore, only fulfil the purpose of giving to the exactions of arbitrary power the appearance as it were of legality ; after the manner in which the Election of Louis Napoleon was legalised in France.

In my opinion they have been in operation quite long enough to determine what effects may be expected from them. Since the year 1815 there have been constitutions in many of the Continental states, and in nearly all of them since the French revolution of 1830. During more than thirty years the Spanish, French, Italian, German, and Hungarian constitu-

tionists toiled on according to the most respectable notions about the virtues of passive resistance and constitutional equilibrium; but, if amongst any of the other nations there were occasional revolutions, the vaunted moderation and forbearance were certainly exercised by none more sublimely and more systematically than by the constitutionalists of the German principalities! They suffered calumny, banishment, penury, prison, and all the horrors of prison discipline, with the most exemplary submission. Some of them, as Behr and Eisenmann, came out of dungeons, old and crippled, which they had entered in their prime. Others died from their sufferings while in keeping, or like Parson Weidig, in Hesse-Darmstadt, were cut off in their cells by the hand of the government bravo! But never, as long as they lived, did those men weary of their constitutional faith. On being released, you see them at work again, beginning precisely at the point where they left off some twenty or thirty years before. Is it not strange that English sympathy, which the cannonading in Hungary called into such lively exercise, remained entirely unobservant of the heroic deeds and the grievous wrongs of the men who had struggled for the precise form of the very kind of constitution many years before they were told that their failure was to be ascribed to the wildness of their imaginations? No, indeed, no people could have been more moderate, more firm, or, in short, more scrupulously observant of the most approved rules of constitutional chivalry than those men were for so many years. But all this was not only lost upon their own sovereigns, but it was lost upon the whole world. So little did the world care for it, that in 1848 the world did not even have a notion of such a long period of

constitutional heroism having preceded the catastrophe of 1848.

It would seem that your very instincts had taught you that such labour under such circumstances must be fruitless. Still the labour was heroic; and if the press remained fettered, public meetings prohibited, the right of association denied, individual liberty down-trodden—in short, the lives, properties, and actions of all men as much as ever at the mercy of the police—it is certain that these perpetuated and augmented wrongs cannot be said to have been rendered necessary by any want of moderation, forbearance, or patient effort on the part of the constitutionalists. The great error of those men was the radical error of all their advisers, who think that liberty can be *created* by any introduction of modes and institutions which, in this country, have been the *result* of liberty and national independence.

And now let us take a short glance at the revolutionary period itself. Take, for example, Prussia. In the height of European excitement, the petitions presented to the king by several municipal bodies and popular assemblies at Berlin contained nothing, either in language or substance, that could have given offence to the most delicate constitutional ear. But when the people were assembled, in expectation of a straightforward reply to their call for a change of the ministry, liberty of the press, trial by jury, and such like purely constitutional petitions, a collision was provoked by the insolence of the soldiers, and, as there is too much reason to suppose, by the secret and sinister influence of a person more deeply interested than any one besides in the question as to what should be in future the nature and extent of the royal power in Prussia. The people had waited thirty-three years for the

answer they were now seeking—and now, when they were peacefully assembled to receive that answer, after an unexampled patience of so many years, the answer they received was—a discharge of musketry! They saw their friends assassinated, their women and children trampled under the cavalry. And now I ask you, if, on a day of unprovoked massacre in recompense of so much patient waiting and pious moderation—if now they had committed any of those excesses, of which they are accused at random and in general terms—who would have the heart to throw the first stone upon them? But where are those alleged excesses? After they had vanquished the soldiery, how did they demean themselves? Did they call for a republic? Did they plunder the houses of the aristocracy? Did they proclaim martial law, flog women, and hang the first men of their country by the dozen on the gallows? No! they were no sooner victors than you hear them singing their hymn of thankfulness before the palace of their king; and they were content that the securing of their long desired and dearly purchased liberties should be entrusted to the Vinckes, Schwerins, Hausemanns, Camphausens, and such men, all known for their decidedly moderate and constitutional principles. In all the other states of the Continent the movement went off on the whole in the same way. In no instance were the people *the first* to appeal to arms; in all instances, when provoked to the struggle, they were victorious; and the first act in their state of freedom was to entrust the guardianship of their rights to the wisdom of men who had been distinguished by the sincerest and most moderate constitutionalism. In short, if constitutionalism could have been made to take natural root in the soil of Continental Europe, I should say, then was the

time for such an achievement; for throughout all the states of the Continent, not excepting France, the powers of government passed into the hands of men who had won their position in public life as professed constitutionalists! It is perfectly true, I own, that extravagant speeches were made (in 1848 and 1849) in the Continental Chambers and out of them. But the material question is, whether the propositions which those speeches were meant to sustain took the majorities of the assemblies along with them. Now it is an acknowledged fact, that throughout the whole revolutionary period, as it is called, the constitutionalists were regularly in the *majority*, till they had been sitting as long as was necessary for absolutism to recover from the fright, and to gather its forces again, when they left the field despondingly to those who had risen in haste, and without any preconcerted plan to give it a last desperate battle. I therefore conclude, that the failure of 1848 and 1849 is not to be traced to any misconduct *in the people*, but that it is to be ascribed to the circumstance of its leaders having before their eyes the example of the English institutions, instead of looking at the case of the Continent as a case by itself. M. Guizot has written a long and elaborate essay, in which he does not forget to mention any of the points of comparison between the English and Continental revolutions excepting the real point in question. Now, if I dare to give my opinion on this matter, I believe that the English revolution has succeeded—firstly, because the state of England was not established as a bureaucratic and military machinery, like the Continental states; and secondly (which is very nearly connected with the first cause), because it was an affair of one people against one government, and not, as is the case of the Continent, an affair of an

immense variety of people against a general system governing them all. Respecting the first point, there never was in England a necessity for such a military and bureaucratic machinery to keep her together; for in her case the basis of absolutism was in reality wanting. The Tories, although attached to the Stuart family, were as little a centralizing bureaucracy, and as jealous of a body of mercenary soldiers, as the Whigs. The absolutism of the Stuarts, however successful in some of its assaults, was therefore, in fact, a superficial structure on the basis of the feudal and municipal independence of England; whilst, on the Continent, the representative system, however successfully established for a time, with the helps of great popular insurrections, must always remain a superficial structure on the military and functionary basis of the Continental states. In England, absolutism was, in fact, only a doctrine, chiefly derived from the examples of Rome and Spain, without any real basis in either the internal organization or external relations of the island. In the present Continental establishments, a representative constitution is nothing but a doctrine, chiefly derived from the example of England, without any real basis in either the internal organization or external relations of states which were founded and are maintained for military, diplomatic, and dynastic purposes. It is obvious, that it was in the first case constitutional dogmas that lost the battle of liberty in 1848. It was entirely overlooked that the English sovereign had no net of bureaucracy and police spread over every town, and village, and house, of the whole country; nor a standing army of half a million divided between London, Manchester, Edinburgh, and Dublin. It is my opinion, that if the sovereign of Great Britain had the command of two such formidable bodies, and were

besides backed in case of emergency by an alliance with the Austrian and Russian sovereigns, I believe the House of Lords and the House of Commons might make as many speeches as ever they liked, and pass innumerable resolutions, and show themselves either as moderate and forbearing, or as wild and extravagant—as practical or as dreamy and fanciful, as they might be disposed to do—I think it would come to the same thing: the actual power being all in one hand, that power would be absolute, *in fact*; and really practical men, therefore, instead of playing at balancing where there is no balance possible, would seize upon the first favourable opportunity for destroying the actual instruments of absolute power.

Now, that opportunity was offered in 1848, for the hearts of the kings were filled at that time with dismay; and it was because the constitutionalists, instead of directly breaking up the functionary and military bodies, occupied themselves with imitating the balancing of ministerial speeches against opposition speeches, that all things returned gradually to their old level. They were balancing *without* power, whilst the real powers—the military, functionary, and police bodies—had only retreated to the background, frightened for a moment by the revolutionary storm, and were soon reassured, when they found that they were either quite overlooked or actually befriended by the constitutionalists, who, wanting the courage to attack them, concealed their cowardice behind an affected fear of revolution; and declared that they would place themselves as a shield before their dynasties, which without them had plenty of shields to defend them, and swords too! But then, you remember, that to destroy those shields and swords of absolutism, to disband those hordes of officials, soldiers, and gendarmes, would have been to

destroy the states, and after the states were destroyed, there would have been an end of all constitutionalism. There remained nothing but republicanism with its imaginary horrors of frantic mobs, plunder and massacre, socialism, communism, and general anarchy. Such were the fears of those whom the people had entrusted with the charge of establishing for them a stable and good order of things. Beyond the existing order of states they saw nothing but chaos. They then did their utmost to maintain the present political system of Europe, by maintaining in its integrity every single military and dynastic establishment of Europe, and then trying to persuade the chiefs of those military establishments, called states, to be kind enough to submit to the resolutions passed by themselves (although there was not the least necessity for doing so) on behalf of a potentate who had half a million of soldiers at his command, and all the armies of Europe at his back. The never-failing instinct of the people of Europe called for the revival of their nationality—the independence of Hungary, the resurrection of Poland, the unity of Germany and of Italy—such were the first watchwords of the revolution. The people of Europe did not dream at that moment of improving their social condition sword in hand. The thing, obviously impossible as it was, did not occur to them before they were driven to despair. They had, however, convinced themselves that the cause of all their evils was in the European system; and you might, therefore, have seen the national flags waving from every house, thus betraying their real first impulse, which rarely misdirects them. But the question was, how to realize the national restoration of the European people? The masses, having no political knowledge, as I told you, entrusted the Vinckes, the Gagerns, the Giobertis, the

Charles Alberts, themselves, with the task of securing their dearly bought liberties. As a matter of course, the same men who thought they might persuade the dynasties into constitutionalism, after having left them in full possession of their absolute power, thought they might persuade the same princes into national unity, without interfering in the least with their sovereign independence.

Thus they sat, at Frankfort, persuading and persuading, and thus they sat at the capitals of the separate principalities, persuading and persuading, whilst the princes re-kindled the martial and dynastic spirit of their armies; while the bureaucracies (which had been frightened to death) became aware that to give way to the Chambers or to the desires of the people for unity, would be to sign the death-warrant of their own power and livelihood; and while all the princes concerted a common plan of getting rid of these popular clamours and of these constitutional pedants for ever. And thus, in proper time, the forms of the old political system of Europe were restored, its foundations never having been altered for a moment.

If that unity, therefore, had not been attempted, the result must have been exactly the same; and if not one extravagant speech had been made, and not one riot had taken place, (I remind you that in no country, and least of all in England, are great political reforms carried without disturbance,) the result would have still been the same; or, if the people had acted according to the imagination of their calumniators, and had, in the days of their victory, committed the same sanguinary horrors which afterwards were committed by the dynasties in the days of their triumph—the result would still have been the same. The fault was neither in their national aspirations, nor in the wildness of

their behaviour or demands—it was solely in the want of appreciation of their own case. The fault was in their applying the doctrine of institutions (which have grown up in this island in perfect consonance with the particular conditions of its existence)—it was in their applying that doctrine to establishments which are based upon a military and functionary organization, in which, therefore, the power of the crown cannot be balanced by any speech-making, whether good or bad, whether mild and sensible, or furious and fanatic.

The constitutional pedants of Germany and Italy, however, might bear with the abuse now heaped upon them by their brethren in pedantry of other countries, if they had not a much heavier reproach upon their conscience. They were mainly actuated by a highly learned and imitative respect of the rights of crowned heads, who had no rights whatever, since their supposed rights were never confirmed by any agreement with their different subjects, as is the case in England. The English state, it may be admitted, is founded upon a contract between the monarch and the people; but on the Continent the states are established by a contract between all the monarchs to the exclusion of all the people. Now, by being determined not to touch upon those imaginary rights, and attempting at the same time to re-establish the unity of the German empire, the German professors of constitutionalism did not only essay the impossible, but offered themselves as the *instruments* of oppression both against the people and against the rights and the independence of other nations. In their loyalty they offered to the Houses of Hohen-Zollern and Hapsburgh the assistance of all Germany to maintain the integrity of the Austrian and Prussian empires. Thus, by their constitutional love of the rights of monarchy, they made themselves

the gaolers of Hungary, Poland, and Italy ; and the re-establishment of the German nation became identified in the minds of the other nations of Europe with the eternal continuance of their own slavery ; since the perpetuation of all the provinces of Austria in their relation to the Austrian monarchy, and of the provinces of Prussia in their relation to the Prussian monarchy, and the institution of a great central German power over both these powers—what could this be in the eyes of all intelligent men, of whatever nation, but to give more complexity and a better prospect of duration to all the essential mischiefs of European servitude ?

My own conclusion from this series of facts and experiments is, that it is not merely futile, but cruel, to extend encouragement to popular principles in Austria, Prussia, or France, or any of the smaller Continental principalities, unless we are prepared to approve of changes that must be fatal to the dynastic tyrannies which have so long ruled in those countries. The struggle of the Continent is not so much one of the comparative merits of the three forms of political rule—Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy—as one between three principal races, the Romanic, the Teutonic, and the Sclavonian. All our theories on representative, monarchical, republican or social institutions, cannot alter anything in the reality of those three fundamental powers of European history. They are conscious of their distinct existence ; they are conscious of having some very old accounts to settle between themselves ; they are partly highly civilized, partly midway between barbarism and civilization, and partly not yet emerged from very savageness. Now, it is not between Frederick William of Prussia, nor between Victor Emanuel of Sardinia, and a few bad speakers, that the affairs of seventy millions of Germans and Italians are to be

settled; but it is between the centre of Europe and the Slavic race on one side, and the ships and industry of England, and the natural treasures of America on the other. On the East the Continent is chained politically; on the West, commercially. Let us throw a glance upon these two points, for they are the points which alone are worth speaking about.

Russia, we see, governs Germany through Prussia; and Prussia through Denmark. Russia, you are aware, commands Persia and the adjoining countries, from the heights of the Plateau of Central Asia. It remains, then, that she should have in her power the Austrian and Turkish empires, in order to govern nearly the whole of this hemisphere, with the exception of the South-eastern parts of Asia. Austria, however, is already held in the Russian grasp; and Turkey will, like a ripe pear, fall into her lap, on the day when England, through some war with France, or for any other reason, may be forced to relax her watch at the gates of the Bosphorus. This was as nearly as possible realized in 1848 and 1849.

There are in the north of Turkey several provinces, known under the name of the Danube provinces,—Servia, Moldavia, and Wallachia—of which Russia has managed to be acknowledged the protector, by the common agreement of the European powers. Those provinces nominally still belong to Turkey; but they rose against the Sultan about the time of the Greek insurrection, and that not without Russia's assistance; the inhabitants being, like the Greeks, for the greater part Christians, Russia knew how to engage the sympathies of Europe on their behalf, and she was appointed the guardian of their liberties. By this means she has at present acquired a right to march into those provinces, and thence to command Austria and Turkey

at the same time, just as from the Duchy of Warsaw she commands Austria and Prussia. The moment, therefore, the revolution broke out in 1848, in France, Germany, and Italy, Russia sent her agents to Wallachia, to raise a revolution in that principality, in order to have a pretext for occupying it. You see at one glance to what end : she could from thence seize upon the favourable moment to pounce upon Constantinople, while at the same time she could watch the threatening aspect of affairs in Hungary. It was in vain that the Sultan remonstrated against the disinterested friendship of Russia ! That power was generously determined to restore order in that rebellious province, and to repress that miniature revolution by a help of 90,000 men, although the Sultan was on perfectly good terms with his rebellious subjects. At the same time General Grabbe was sent to Constantinople to demand the renewal of the treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi. By that treaty the right of passing through the Dardanelles had been guaranteed to the Russian fleet. Upon this request, it is said, the Porte, feeling that her political existence was aimed at, addressed herself to the English and French ambassadors, asking what England and France were willing to do in case of a rupture between the Porte and St. Petersburg. Having received an answer encouraging on the whole, Turkey peremptorily refused the renewal of the treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi ; and, although she could not hinder the presence of the Russian army in Wallachia, it was stipulated that the Russian and Turkish troops were to be of equal number. In the meantime the Hungarian war broke out, and Russia, feeling herself threatened by the possible consequences of that insurrection, was now no longer able to pursue her plans upon Constantinople ; for if the Magyars had been triumphant,

not only Poland would have risen in insurrection, but Russia would have lost all chance of domineering over the Danube provinces—that fortress, as it were, from which she keeps both the Turkish and Austrian empires in continual apprehension and dependence.

It was, therefore, not from any kind of sympathy of principle that Russia offered her assistance to the Austrian government; but she fought for her most vital interests and most cherished projects, nay, for very existence. This is so certain, that, as early as the year 1834, Mr. Prondzinsky, an officer of the Russian general's staff, had already drawn the plans and maps of an Hungarian campaign; for, when Hungary began to reclaim her constitutional and national rights, Russia began to fear that her projects in respect to the Danube provinces would be obstructed by the interests and energies of a strong national body in the immediate neighbourhood of the Danube. The Magyars began, indeed, to open regular steam communication on the Danube, which, in course of time, might have become a powerful instrumentality, uniting all the neighbouring tribes, in spite of their original jealousies, by the interests of commerce, into one powerful anti-Russian federation. Since that time English diplomacy never ceased to take an interest in the progress of Hungarian prosperity and independence; whilst, as I observed, Russia prepared her maps and plans to be ready for a campaign.

I think all these facts, which I quote only by way of instances (the whole international history of Europe being made up of similar ones), must convince you that I was justified in asserting, that any state of peace, which it is possible under the present system to maintain for a time, is only a preparation for an ultimate universal war, in which the different governments of

Europe and Asia, whilst imagining that they fight the battles of their own jealousies and ambitions, will be made to fight those of the two colossal powers, England and Russia. At the same time, the case of Hungary may serve as an instance, how much the prosperity and progress of the European and Asiatic people are influenced and obstructed by the international system in which they are thus forcibly held. Whilst England, for example, was interested in the prosperity and progress of Hungary as a bar in the way of Russia in her designs upon Constantinople, it was a question of the utmost importance for Russia, to have the national energies of the Magyars broken, and to destroy the rising trade of the Danube, which would have immensely favoured the commercial development of Germany and of Asia Minor, and have formed a new vein of healthy life and improving communication between the Indian empire and the mother country. Now, whether in Hungary or along the coasts of the Mediterranean—whether in Spain, in Persia, or in the heart of Germany—the people of all these countries are equally tossed about between Russian and English as well as between Austrian, Prussian, and French influence, a small part of them experiencing, in consequence, a momentary prosperity, but the greater part finding themselves systematically cut off from the air of commercial and industrial life, while all of them are held in a state of moral dependence upon foreign governments, destructive alike of their individual and their national character.

The question of freedom, then, is not one between the people of each state and its government; but between our Romano-Teutonic civilization and the Slaves. And the question, on the other hand, is not, whether one state or the other violates the treaties by

adding so many inches of ground to its territory: but whether the Continental states of Europe are to take a part in the great commercial and industrial development which has been opened by the discovery of America, or not. In the latter respect, the policy of England has been as injurious to the Continent as that of Russia. I know that more enlightened principles are gaining ground here. No one can acknowledge more freely and with more sincere admiration, the beautiful earnestness with which the English people are working to realize all that is good, whether in their internal or in their external policy, and in my deliberate opinion there is no people of purer ideal aspirations than the English. But that work is only just in its beginning; the ideas of fair play for all nations, of peace and brotherhood, are far from having penetrated, as yet, into those cloudy regions where the foreign secretary is throned high above the voice and the understanding of the English public, and guided by nothing but the voice of his own aristocratic conscience and the traditions of exclusiveness and national jealousy, inherited from the times of the struggle for colonial independence. To prevent any European nation from becoming powerful at sea, is still, besides its enmity against Russia, the leading principle of English diplomacy. Now, Italy would be powerful on the Mediterranean, as she was in the Middle Ages, if she were united; and Germany would be the same on the Black Sea, in Asia Minor, and on the Atlantic, if she were united: Holland and Belgium, that cut her off from the North Sea; Denmark, that intercepts her communication with the North Sea and the Baltic; Russia, that stops the mouth of the Danube—would cease to bar her from the trade of the world and the air of national life. Imagine only that the central people of

Europe had only one coast, extending from the neighbourhood of St. Petersburg to the South of Ostend, and had the Black Sea and the Adriatic joined by railroads along that one coast, with all its splendid sea-ports! Such would be the inevitable consequence of German unity; and it requires a great heart to pursue, in the face of such a certainty, any but Lord Palmerston's policy. Russia is to be checked; but Italy and Germany are not to become great commercial powers. How is Russia to be checked, being looked upon by all the governments, as she is, as the stronghold of their own absolutism? By encouraging the introduction of the English forms of government, and of the absolute power of the exchange, into each separate Continental state. For the exchange-men of all countries are all dependent upon London; and wherever *they* command, English interest commands. Thus it is stock-jobbing constitutionalism which is the principle of English diplomacy; whilst that of Russian diplomacy is absolutism and dynastic jealousy. It is difficult to say, which of the two is more demoralizing, and more calculated to thwart the energies of those nations; but in their continuation, as absolutism legalized by the dirtiest part of money interest, they change the whole of Continental Europe into a gambling-house, and a school for vice.

It is inexplicable how some people have the impudence, and others the simplicity, to speak of the balance of power, which is said to be violated by Austria annexing a little town, like Cracow; or France Belgium; while Russia extends her dominion over the half of Europe and Asia; and whilst the English empire comprises something between one hundred and fifty and two hundred millions of people! Two or three hundred years ago, when the principal interests of

European civilization were all to be settled between the Continental powers, that system had some sense. At present it is merely a pretext for using the central nations of Europe, as Turkey and Persia are used, viz., as materials of war. It is not the position of Sardinia or of Prussia, which a really practical politician has to consider; but the position of Europe with her civilization, her moral and intellectual powers, her industrial progress and her population, in her relation to America on the one side, and to the East on the other. America is, mainly speaking, with regard to Europe still in the position of a great colony. The time when each of the European powers tried to appropriate as much of the transmarine world as possible to itself, and of excluding all other states from participating in its trade, is past. The colonies are, with single exceptions, become common property. The produce of their virgin soil must be exchanged for works of European industry; and works of European industry must be exchanged for, and are dependent for their raw material upon the produce of their soil. In proportion as the population of America, Australia, and other colonies increases, the European industry must increase, with which those countries cannot compete, labour being scarce with them, as it is abundant here. England begins to feel the injustice and impossibility of monopolizing the market of the world, both for her manufactures and for her merchant-navy. She invites the nations to take part; but her invitation sounds like a mockery, while it is her diplomacy which forms one of the chief impediments to national development. Those of you who, by sending to Continental nations missionaries of peace, or of representative constitutionalism, or of free trade, think that you will deliver them from their degradation, may remember, that 2,000 years ago,

missionaries of peace were sent to all the nations of Europe and Asia, and that for two thousand years they have been working, I do not mean to say in vain, but with a measure of success proportioned to the cessation of the natural animosities between the Teutonic and Romanic races, and to the ameliorating influence of commerce and industry.*

It is not so much required to offer principles and doctrines to those nations, as to offer them a basis, upon which an understanding is practicable. Do the Austrian, the Prussian, and the Russian monarchies—the ambitions of France, or the petty constitutionalism of Lord Palmerston, offer such a basis? I think not. If you offend the spirit of the Italian, the Hungarian, and the Pole, by forcing them into submission, under a German bureaucracy or a French soldiery, they will, at length, turn upon the race of their offenders. If different races, filled with a hatred against each other, which is fanned by the policy of great dynasties, are kept together through forcible combinations, they will grow mad with the spirit of hatred and of revenge. If a nation is distracted, plunged into stupid sensualism on the one side, and trained in puerile vanity on the other, and you offer to such a nation mock institutions as a certain cure of all its evils, and teach her to enslave her neighbours, whilst abusing her for doing so—such a nation will become

* We can only admit this allusion to the progress of Christianity in a qualified sense. We believe that a proclamation of the gospel, which fails not to notice and allow for the diversities of race and position, will be, as it has ever been, the most widely successful; but it is also our conviction, that so far from the progress of civilization and commerce having been the measure of the spread of Christianity, it is, on the contrary, true, that the progress of religion (understanding by the term, evangelical Protestant Christianity) has been the measure of the spread of civilization and commerce. Witness, in illustration, the commercial histories of England, Holland and Belgium, and America.—ED.

sensual, puerile, vain, and sceptical, in proportion as she is endowed with high intellectual and moral faculties. Such is the education by which Germany is being prepared for the impending conflict. When the first Roman emperors held the reins of the old world, "in the most high and palmy state of Rome," the practical politicians of that proud empire, smiled at the splenetic speculations of a certain literary dreamer with the name of Tacitus, who, in writing a book on the manners and customs of the German savages in the North of Italy, seemed to be inspired with a sombre presentiment of the savages of northern forests being destined to overrun and destroy the power of Imperial Rome! On comparing the imperfect military knowledge of those barbarians, divided into innumerable tribes, with the disciplined Roman legions, in the possession of all the arts of war, and with that most perfect administrative machinery, by which the resources of the whole empire were concentrated for either defence or attack, who would have not ridiculed the idea of the Goths breaking their way through thousands of miles of steppes and deserts, and through hostile tribes, in order to conquer the civilized world? Still it was done. But it was not done by a foolish attempt of the Goths to march directly from the borders of the Black Sea, upon Rome; but it was chiefly done by the dependence into which the Roman emperors gradually fell upon the assistance of barbarian chiefs; and that state of dependence was brought about by the very perfection of the administrative machinery which was destructive to the national character and energies of the people subjected to it, and therefore produced prætorianism and that state of internal putrefaction which had already destroyed the Roman empire from within, before it was conquered

from without. For the same reason the states of Continental Europe are being internally destroyed before they are externally conquered. It is, indeed, not the probable conquest of the Continent by Russian troops which fills me with apprehension ; but it is that decay which I see presently at work in all those countries, which makes the power of Russia appear formidable to me. Whilst others are ridiculing the fears of a future ascendancy of Russia in Europe, I am satisfied with deploring the present effects of the Russian ascendancy, which actually make themselves felt, which are to be met with in every country of the Continent, and which are not matters of anticipation. I think it is quite sufficient to see Europe governed by the edge of the sword, torn by factions, and threatened with war, and to find that all these things are not the doings of any particular body of men, but are the eruptions of a constitutional disease, that will last as long as the present international constitution of Europe lasts ; that they are, in short, the consequence of the German and Italian dynasties being dependent upon Austria and Prussia, and of Austria and Prussia being dependent upon Russia, whilst France, in her restless ambition, does not know where to turn, and England tries in vain, either by diplomatic arts or well-meaning admonitions, to remedy an evil which can only be remedied by re-constructing Europe upon the basis of national independence.

I look over the surface of Continental Europe, and calling to mind its ancient glories, I ask, Is there no hope ? Are the noble countries that border upon the waters of the Mediterranean, those countries from which all the arts of our present civilization proceeded, are they to remain like an exhausted soil, that has been worked until it will yield no fruit ? Those towns of the

Rhine, and of the Danube, and of the Baltic, that once formed a league powerful enough to force the fruits and inventions of peace and plenty upon the very night of the dark ages, and whose commerce, embracing the whole known world, carried civilization to the borders of Siberia, are they never to raise their heads again, but to linger on through ages by the sufferance of the policemen and soldiers of petty prefects and foreign tyrants? Is the race of the Saxon plains, and of the Holstein marshes, no longer the same, from which this island was peopled, from which the greatest and freest of nations sprang? I trust that it is still the same. The Germans are still of the same stuff of which Guttenbergs and Luthers were formed. They are still prolific in Goethes, Schillers, and Humboldts! It is in the memory of men, that they rose all like one man, nay, all like one hero, to throw off the yoke of the foreigner.

The Italians are still of the same material of which Dantes and Raffaelles were made. The very man who loved to sit on ruins, and to shut his eyes to every ray of hope, could not resist the refreshing influence of Italian genius; and he who was unwilling to allow that anything was durable, was obliged to confess that the spirit of that nation was eternal. And if the spirit of art and of science make a nation indestructible, there is certainly hope of eternal life for a nation that, like the *Polish* is, as it were, one uninterrupted manifestation of the spirit of nationality itself, in which every man and every woman are ready at any moment to sacrifice themselves, and all that is dearest to them, to that which is still *dearer* than all—their country. There is that depth of fidelity to one great and imperishable thought in those men,—that faith which carries victory through the gates of death. Of the Hungarians

I need not speak. To tell you that they are heroes, would be like telling you that Shakspeare is a poet, and that the sun gives light; and having, as they have, maintained their national independence through ages, against hostile nations and unvarying tyranny, there is yet a chance of their maintaining it for some time to come. There are still in the centre of Europe four great nations, enslaved, though possessed of the highest faculties and most powerful energies—the very nations from which not only the civilization, but the most prosperous and flourishing communities of the world sprang; and those nations, after a struggle of many centuries—a struggle of arms as well as of thoughts—have at last arrived at that general equality of ideas, sentiments, and manners, which embraces them all in one civilization; and although their peculiarities of character and genius are happily still strong enough to prevent a stupid uniformity, they are sufficiently worn off to admit of an amicable understanding, the more so as they are so situated as to have exactly the same interests. Those nations are now, by an unnatural dismemberment, or by unnatural combinations, trained to hate each other; nay, different portions of the same nation are, by the same unfortunate contrivance, forced to pay an enormous sum for keeping bands of murderers, or still worse, are, against their own will and under penalty of high treason, enlisted in such bands, for the purpose of keeping themselves in that state of dismemberment, by which their national energies are dwarfed, their hearts corrupted, and they are thrust down from their place as men, and are used up as the mere material of a war carried on between two foreign powers. Thus prevented as they are from exercising those powers of mind which they possess, in accordance with the wants of their state of

civilization. Thus deprived of the free use of their material and economical powers, they naturally turn all the venom of their blasted hopes and crippled energies against each other, thus adding a further element of social decomposition to those evils entailed upon them by the political system of Europe. And all this for what? That certain families may rule—that some chance-possessors of power may continue to preserve it for a time till they are swallowed by their mightier neighbours—all to be drowned at last in one gulf of social war and national barbarism! On the other hand, the removal of two families from their supremacy, would suffice to allow the people of Europe to drop into their national positions and relationships, and would place the several races and sections of races at liberty to work out their own development and progress in the manner most congenial to their nature, history, and circumstances. Once free, and allowed to care for their own, after their own manner, there might be governments of various forms in Frankfort, or Pesth, in Warsaw, or Rome; and states thus severally independent—independent on a natural basis—would, beyond the least doubt—as the result of their common civilization, of their common commercial interest, and in behalf of their common weal—have their common centre of confederate unity, as in the case of the United States of America.


The nationality of these countries, is, in itself, the highest ideal object; it is what health is to the body. But what are the effects of health? Let us for once lift our eyes, and then we should discover to our astonishment, that old Europe is in the possession of quite as many resources as new America. We should discover that Europe has her backwoods in the virgin forests of Poland, of Russia, and of Turkey; that the

steppes of the East allow still as large a scope for the emigrants of our surplus population as those of the "far West;" and we should find, let but liberty spread her sheltering wings over those countries, that our hardy labourers will seek their fortune nearer home, and so their energies and newly-acquired wealth will not be lost to their mother countries, but will stream back to enrich again and again the parent source with new vitality, while, at the same time, they would carry, step by step, our civilization into the very heart of Asia. Thus, would trade and commerce, industry, art, science, national health and social harmony, revive in this portion of the earth, and assign to its people a progress, the glory of which would be greater than that of anything that has gone before. I therefore need not excuse myself for having spoken to you on a subject in which the destiny of the world, as it were, and undoubtedly your own, is involved. I shall and must speak on that subject as long as I have a voice. But it is a feeble voice, and therefore it has been kind of you to listen to it.

THE END.







THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60607-7090

TEL: 773/936-3200 FAX: 773/936-4700

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